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AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Original FAA AC 25.1309-1B, PDF page 72
AC 25.1309-1B · F-3Open saved PDF here ↗
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F.3.3 If the failure rate of one element varies during different flight phases, the calculation should consider the failure rate and related time increments in such a manner as to establish the probability of the failure occurring on an average flight. It is assumed that the average flight can be divided into n phases (phase 1, ... , phase n). Let TF be the average flight duration, Tj be the duration of phase j, and tj be the transition point between Tj and Tj+1, j = 1, ... , n:

𝑛𝑛

𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹= ෍𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 and 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗−𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗−1 = 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗=1

Let λj(t) be the failure rate function during phase j, i.e., for t ∈ [tj-1,tj]. λj(t) may be equal to 0 for all t ∈ [tj-1,tj] for a specific phase j.

Let Pphase j(failure) be the probability that the element fails in phase j.

Two cases are possible:

F.3.3.1 The element is checked operative at the beginning of the certain flight. Let the Pflight(failure) be the probability that the element fails during one certain flight (including non-flying time).

Then:

𝑛𝑛 𝑛𝑛

𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓) = ෍𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑗𝑗(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓) = ෍𝑃𝑃൫𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ห𝑡𝑡∈ൣ𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗−1, 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗൧൯

𝑗𝑗=1 𝑗𝑗=1 𝑡𝑡 𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖

= 1 −ෑ𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ቌ−න𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒ቍ

𝑓𝑓=1 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1

F.3.3.2 The state of the element is unknown at the beginning of the certain flight. Let the Pflight(failure) be the probability that the element is failed by the end of one certain flight (including non-flying time).

Then:

𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡) + 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡)

= 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡) + ቀ1 −𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡)ቁ

𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∗ቌ1 −ෑ𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ቆ−න 𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒ቇቍ 𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓=1 𝑖𝑖−1

Where Pprior(failure) is the probability that the failure of the element has occurred prior to the certain flight.

F.3.4 If there is only an effect when failures occur in a certain order, the calculation should account for the conditional probability that the failures occur in the sequence necessary to produce the failure condition.

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

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75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

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