FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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5.3.1.1 Possible failure conditions and their causes, modes of failure, and damage from sources external to the system.

5.3.1.2 The possibility of multiple failures due to a common cause, multiple independent failures, and undetected failures.

5.3.1.3 The possibility of requirement, design, and implementation errors.

5.3.1.4 The effect of flightcrew errors reasonably expected in service after the occurrence of a failure or failure condition. (See AC 25.1302-1.)

5.3.1.5 The effect of reasonably anticipated errors when performing maintenance actions.

5.3.1.6 The flightcrew alerting cues, corrective action required, and the flightcrew capability of detecting faults.

5.3.1.7 The resulting effects on the airplane and its occupants, or other persons (such as ground crew or maintenance personnel), considering the stage of flight, the operational sequences (sequence of system responses or expected flightcrew actions following a failure(s)), and operating and environmental conditions.

5.3.2 Planning. This AC provides guidance on methods of accomplishing the safety objective. The detailed methodology needed to achieve this safety objective depends on many factors, particularly, the degree of system complexity and integration. For proposed airplane designs that will contain many complex or integrated systems, it is likely that the applicant will need to propose and develop a plan to describe the intended process. In general, the extent and structure of the analyses to show compliance with § 25.1309 will be greater when the system is more complex, and the effects of the failure conditions are more severe. Industry standards such as those listed in paragraph 1.4.5 of this AC provide further information on the planning activity. This plan should include consideration of all of the following aspects:

5.3.2.1 Functional and physical interrelationships of systems.

5.3.2.2 Determination of detailed means of compliance, which may include the use of development assurance techniques.

5.3.2.3 Means for establishing the accomplishment of the plan, including how the plan is followed throughout the project to ensure completion.

5.3.3 Availability of Industry Standards and Guidance Materials. There are a variety of acceptable techniques used currently in industry, some of which are reflected in SAE ARP 4754 and ARP 4761. This AC is not intended to constrain the applicant to the use of these documents in defining their particular methods for

AC 25.1309-1B · 5-3Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

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