FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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APPENDIX F. CALCULATING THE “AVERAGE PROBABILITY PER FLIGHT HOUR”

F.1 Purpose. This appendix provides applicants with guidance for calculating the “average probability per flight hour” for a failure condition, so it can be compared with the quantitative criteria in this AC. (As discussed in paragraph 7.6.1.4, for failure conditions and associated classifications that are only relevant during a specific flight phase, evaluate the average risk under those specific conditions rather than allowing the risk to be averaged out over a flight of mean duration. For these cases, the probability is calculated as an average probability per flight. To convert to “average probability per flight hour”, divide the per flight probability by one hour.) The process of calculating the “average probability per flight hour” for a failure condition is described here as a four step process and is based on the assumption that the life of an airplane is a sequence of average flights:

• Step 1: Determine the average flight.

• Step 2: Calculate the probability of a failure condition for a certain average flight.

• Step 3: Calculate the average probability per flight of a failure condition.

• Step 4: Calculate the average probability per flight hour of a failure condition.

F.2 Determining the “Average Flight.” The “average probability per flight hour” is based on an average flight. The applicant should estimate the average flight duration and average flight profile for the airplane fleet to be certified. The average flight duration should be estimated based on the applicant’s expectations and historical experience for similar types. The average flight duration should reflect the applicant’s best and latest estimate of the cumulative flight hours divided by the cumulative airplane flights for the service life of the airplane. The average flight profile should be based on the operating weight and performance expectations for the average airplane when flying a flight of average duration in an International Civil Aviation Organization standard atmosphere. The duration of each flight phase (for example, takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, approach, and landing) in the average flight should be based on the average flight profile. Average taxi times for departure and arrival at an airport should be considered where appropriate and added to the average flight time. The average flight duration and profile should be used as the basis for determining the average probability per flight hour for a quantitative safety assessment. Note that to meet 14 CFR Appendix K to Part 25, K25.1 ETOPS design requirements, the consideration for maximum flight duration with the longest diversion time should be used when showing compliance with § 25.1309(b).

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

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