FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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5.4 Compliance with § 25.1309(c).

5.4.1 Section 25.1309(c) requires that information concerning unsafe system operating conditions be provided to the flightcrew to enable them to take appropriate corrective action in a timely manner, thereby mitigating the effects of the condition to an acceptable level. Any system operating condition that, if not detected and properly accommodated by flightcrew action, would significantly contribute to, or result in, a hazardous or catastrophic condition, should be considered an unsafe system operating condition. Compliance with this requirement usually relies on the analysis identified in paragraph 5.3.1 of this AC, which also includes consideration of crew alerting cues, required corrective action, and the capability of detecting faults. Section 25.1309(c) further requires that the applicant design the systems and controls, including indication and annunciation, to minimize crew errors that could create additional hazards (in compliance with § 25.1302). The required information may be provided by an indication and/or annunciation whose forms and functions meet the requirements of § 25.1322 or may be provided by other dedicated means of information,2 or may be made apparent by the inherent airplane responses. The required information also depends on the degree of urgency for recognition and corrective action by the crew.

5.4.2 When a system provides failure monitoring and indication, the system reliability should be compatible with the safety objectives associated with the system function for which it provides that indication. For example, if the effects of having a system failure and not annunciating that failure are catastrophic, the combination of the system failure with the failure of its annunciation must be extremely improbable. The loss of annunciation should be considered a failure condition in and of itself, due to its impact on the ability of the flightcrew to cope with the subject failure. The subject failure condition should be classified as major unless the applicant can show otherwise. In addition, the applicant should assess unwanted operation (for example, nuisance alerts). The failure monitoring and indication should be reliable, technologically feasible, and economically practicable. Reliable failure monitoring and indication should use current state-of-the-art technology to maximize the probability of detecting and indicating genuine failures, while minimizing the probability of falsely detecting and indicating non-existent failures. Any indication to the flightcrew should be timely, obvious, clear, and unambiguous.

5.4.3 In the case of airplane conditions requiring immediate flightcrew action, a suitable warning indication must be provided to the flightcrew in accordance with § 25.1322, if not provided by inherent airplane characteristics (for example, buffeting). In either case, any warning should be rousing and should occur at a point in a potentially catastrophic sequence where the airplane’s capability and the flightcrew’s ability still remain sufficient for effective crew action to prevent the catastrophic outcome. For

2 The terms alert, annunciation and indication are used interchangeably throughout this AC. These terms have been defined and used in different ways, and their definitions may change in the future. Refer to AC 25.1322 and other relevant ACs for the definitions of these terms and their specific application.

AC 25.1309-1B · 5-8Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

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