FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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APPENDIX B. ASSESSMENT METHODS FOR FAILURE CONDITIONS

B.1 Assessment Methods. Various methods for assessing the causes, severity, and probability of failure conditions are available to support experienced engineering and operational judgment. Some of these methods are structured. The various types of analysis are based on either inductive or deductive approaches. Probability assessments may be qualitative or quantitative. Descriptions of some types of analysis are provided below and in SAE ARP 4761.

B.1.1 Design Appraisal. This is a qualitative appraisal of the integrity and safety of the system design.

B.1.2 Installation Appraisal. This is a qualitative appraisal of the integrity and safety of the installation including the evaluation of any deviations from normal, industry-accepted installation practices, such as clearances or tolerances, especially in the case of modifications made after entry into service.

B.1.3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. This is a structured, inductive, bottom-up analysis that is used to evaluate the effects on the system and airplane of each foreseeable element or component failure. When properly formatted, the FMEA should aid in identifying latent failures and possible causes of each failure mode. SAE ARP 4761 provides methodology and detailed guidelines, which may be used to perform this type of analysis. In SAE ARP 4761, an FMEA could be a “piece-part” FMEA or a “functional” FMEA. For modern microcircuit-based line replaceable units and systems, an exhaustive piece-part FMEA is not practically feasible with the present state of the art. In that context, an FMEA may be more functional than piece-part oriented. A functional FMEA can lead to uncertainties in the qualitative and quantitative aspects, which can be compensated for by a more conservative assessment such as—

• Assuming all failure modes result in the failure conditions of interest,

• Careful choice of system architecture, or

• Taking into account the experience lessons learned on the use of similar technology.

B.1.4 Fault Tree or Dependence Diagram Analysis. These are structured, deductive, top-down analyses used to identify the conditions, failures, and events that would cause each defined failure condition. They are graphical methods of identifying the logical relationship between each particular failure condition and the primary element or component failures, other events, or combinations thereof that can cause it. An FMEA may be used as the source document for those primary failures or other events.

AC 25.1309-1B · B-1Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

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75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

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