FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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• Disconnection of more than one subsystem or component by overtemperature protection devices,

• Contamination by fluids,

• Damage from localized fires,

• Loss of power supply or return (for example, mechanical damage or deterioration of connections),

• Failure of sensors that provide data to multiple systems,

• Excessive voltage,

• Physical or environmental interactions among parts,

• Requirements, design, implementation, installation, flightcrew or ground crew operations, maintenance, and manufacturing errors, or

• Events external to the system or to the airplane.

7.5 Depth of Analysis. The following identifies the depth of analysis expected based on the classification of a failure condition. In all cases discussed below, the applicant should consider the combinations of failure condition effects, as noted in chapter 6 of this AC.

7.5.1 No Safety Effect Failure Conditions. An FHA with a design and installation appraisal to establish independence from other functions is necessary for the safety assessment of these failure conditions. If it is apparent that an FHA is not necessary for a simple function (for example, the loss of an in-flight entertainment function) and the applicant chooses not to do an FHA, then the safety effects may be derived from the design and installation appraisal performed by the applicant.

7.5.2 Minor Failure Conditions. An FHA with a design and installation appraisal to establish independence from other functions is necessary for the safety assessment of these failure conditions. If the applicant chooses not to do an FHA, then the safety effects may be derived from the design and installation appraisal performed by the applicant. The applicant should document the result of the appraisal. If system complexity or integration is such that a design or installation appraisal alone cannot establish such isolation or functional independence, then more formal methods as described in SAE ARP 4754/4761 should be applied.

AC 25.1309-1B · 7-3Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

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