FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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extremely improbable, respectively, based on experienced engineering judgment using only qualitative analysis. The basis for the assessment is the degree of redundancy, the established independence, isolation of the channels, and the reliability record of the technology involved. Satisfactory service experience on similar systems commonly used in many airplanes may be sufficient when a close similarity is established in respect to both the system design and operating conditions.

7.5.4.3 For complex systems where true similarity in all relevant attributes, including installation attributes, can be rigorously established, it may also be possible to assess a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition as extremely remote or extremely improbable, respectively, based on experienced engineering judgment using only qualitative analysis. A high degree of similarity in both design and application is required to be substantiated. Further, the applicant must be able to demonstrate that the baseline design complies. This typically requires that the applicant has access to all the type design data for the baseline against which the comparison is being made.

7.6 Calculation of Average Probability per Flight Hour (Quantitative Analysis).

7.6.1 The average probability per flight hour is the probability of occurrence, normalized by the flight time, of a failure condition during a flight representing the average “at risk” time of the overall possible flights of the airplane fleet to be certified. The calculation of the average probability per flight hour for a failure condition should consider all of the following:

7.6.1.1 The average flight duration and average flight profile for the airplane type to be certified. Note that this assumption may be affected when showing compliance with section K25.1 ETOPS requirements.

7.6.1.2 All combinations of failures and events that contribute to the failure condition.

7.6.1.3 The conditional probability if a sequence of events is necessary to produce the failure condition.

7.6.1.4 The relevant “at risk” time if a failure condition or event is only relevant

during certain flight phases. If the failure condition occurs during specific flight operations or certain flight phases, it should meet the average risk criteria under those specific conditions rather than allowing the risk to be averaged out over a flight of mean duration. In these cases, the probability requirement is applied as a probability per flight or per flight cycle. To convert to per flight hour, divide the per flight probability by one hour.

7.6.1.5 The total exposure time if the failure can persist for multiple flights.

AC 25.1309-1B · 7-5Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

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75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

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