FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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Printed page 7-7

PDF page 47 of 75

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7.7.1.4 The importance of multi-disciplinary teams in identifying and classifying failure conditions.

7.7.1.5 Effect of flightcrew and maintenance procedures in limiting the impact and propagation of failures. However, the effects of overreliance on flightcrew and maintenance actions are also a part of this consideration.

7.7.2 Rigorous and well-structured design and development procedures play an essential role in facilitating a methodical safety assessment process and providing visibility to the means of compliance. SAE ARP 4754 is recognized as the industry standard of practice for certification of highly integrated or complex airplane systems.

7.7.3 Experienced engineering and operational judgment should be applied when determining whether a system is complex. Comparison with similar, previously approved systems is sometimes helpful. All relevant systems attributes should be considered; however, the complexity of software and hardware do not need to be a dominant factor in determining complexity at the system level. The design of a system may be very complex, but predicting its potential malfunctions may be straightforward. For example, the software and interfaces of a predictive windshear system might be considered complex, but the potential failures of the system could be summarized as false alerts, misleading information, and the loss of ability to predict windshear.

7.8 Operational or Environmental Conditions.

7.8.1 A probability of 1 should usually be used for encountering a discrete condition for which the airplane is designed, such as instrument meteorological conditions or Category III weather operations, or landing distance field length provided in the AFM. However, appendix E of this AC contains allowable probabilities that may be assigned to various operational and environmental conditions for use in computing the average probability per flight hour of failure conditions without further justification. The FAA has provided appendix E for guidance and does not intend it to be exhaustive or prescriptive. Currently, a few items do not have accepted standard statistical data from which to derive a probability figure. However, these items are included either for future consideration, or as items for which the applicant may propose a probability figure supported by statistically valid data or supporting service experience. The applicant may propose additional conditions or different probabilities from those in appendix E of this AC, provided they are based on statistically valid data or supporting service experience. The applicant should provide justification for the data and obtain early agreement from the certification authority when such conditions will be included in an analysis. When combining the probability of such a random condition with that of a system failure(s), care should be taken to ensure that the condition and the system failure(s) are independent of one another, or that any dependencies are properly accounted for.

AC 25.1309-1B · 7-7Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

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