FAA source text, reformatted for reading. Page boundaries and paragraph numbers are retained.
CHAPTER 7. ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE CONDITION PROBABILITIES AND ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS
7.1 General. After the applicant has identified the failure conditions and assessed the severity of the effects of failure conditions, it is the applicant’s responsibility to determine how to show compliance with § 25.1309(b) and obtain a finding of compliance from the FAA. An applicant may use appropriate combinations of one or more of the following methods to show compliance: design and installation reviews, analyses, flight tests, ground tests, simulator tests, or other approved means.
7.2 Assessment of Failure Condition Probabilities.
7.2.1 The probability that a failure condition would occur may be assessed as probable, remote, extremely remote, or extremely improbable. These terms are defined in chapter 3 of this AC (and in § 25.4). Each failure condition should have a probability that is inversely related to the severity of its effects as described in chapter 4 of this AC.
7.2.2 When a system provides protection from events (for example, cargo compartment fire, gusts), its reliability should be compatible with the safety objectives necessary for the failure condition and be associated with the failure of the protection system and the probability of the events. (See additional guidance in paragraph 7.8 and appendix E of this AC.)
7.2.3 An assessment to identify and classify failure conditions is necessarily qualitative. On the other hand, an assessment of the probability of a failure condition may be either qualitative or quantitative. An analysis may range from a report that interprets applicable service data or compares two similar systems to a detailed analysis that may or may not include estimated numerical probabilities. The depth and scope of an analysis depends on the types of functions performed by the system, the severity of failure conditions, and whether the system is complex. Paragraph 7.5, Depth of Analysis, provides more guidance on using a combination of qualitative and quantitative probability assessments of failure conditions.
7.3 Single Failure Considerations.
7.3.1 According to the requirements of § 25.1309(b)(1)(ii), a catastrophic failure condition must not result from the failure of a single component, part, or element of a system. To preclude catastrophic failure conditions, the system design should provide failure containment that limits the propagation of the effects of any single failure. In addition, there must be no common cause failure that could affect both the single component, part, or element, and its failure containment provisions. A single failure includes any set of failures that cannot be shown to be independent from each other. Because errors may cause failures, the implications of errors in requirement specification, design, implementation, installation, flightcrew or ground crew operations, maintenance, and
