FAA source text, reformatted for reading. Page boundaries and paragraph numbers are retained.
satisfying the objectives of this AC. However, these documents contain material and methods that an applicant may choose to use for performing the safety assessment. The FAA recognizes these methods, when correctly applied, as valid for showing compliance with § 25.1309(b). In addition, SAE ARP 4761 contains tutorial information on applying specific engineering methods (for example, Markov analysis and fault tree analysis) that an applicant may wish to use in whole or in part.
5.3.4 Acceptable Application of Development Assurance Methods.
5.3.4.1 Paragraph 5.3.1.3 of this AC states that any analysis necessary to show compliance with § 25.1309(b) should consider the possibility of errors in requirement, design, and implementation. Errors made during the design and development of systems have traditionally been detected and corrected by exhaustive tests conducted on the system and its components, by direct inspection, and by other direct verification methods capable of completely characterizing the performance of the system. These direct techniques may still be appropriate for simple systems, which perform a limited number of functions and are not highly integrated with other airplane systems.
5.3.4.2 For integrated systems, or systems that perform complex functions, exhaustive testing might be either impossible because all of the system states (within a particular system and within the interfacing systems) cannot be determined, or impractical because of the number of tests that must be accomplished. For these types of systems, the applicant may use development assurance techniques to minimize errors. The rigor of development assurance should be determined by the severity of potential effects on the airplane in case of system malfunctions or loss of functions. Acceptable guidelines for development assurance are described in—
• AC 20-174, which recognizes SAE ARP 4754 for aircraft and systems,
• AC 20-115D, which addresses the software aspects of certification, including the use of RTCA Document DO-178, supplements to DO- 178, and tool qualification, and
• AC 20-152A, which addresses airborne electronic hardware aspects of certification, including the use of RTCA Document DO-254.
5.3.4.3 Development assurance activities should define and identify all requirements, including any derived safety requirements needed to manage the many interactions between the systems. The activities should also validate that these requirements are complete and correct and verify that the system design meets those requirements. The development assurance activities should verify that the design provides for fault containment, so that the integrated systems are shown to be fail-safe.
