FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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APPENDIX D. EXAMPLE OF LIMIT LATENCY AND RESIDUAL RISK ANALYSIS FOR COMPLIANCE WITH § 25.1309(b)(5)(ii) and (iii)

D.1 Implementing Quantitative Criteria for a CSL+1 Failure Condition. The following example illustrates how the criteria of § 25.1309(b)(5)(ii) and (iii) may be applied quantitatively. This example uses the fault tree analysis technique described in SAE ARP 4761. Assume a fault tree as shown in figure D-1.

D.1.1 CSL+1 Conditions.

Note: The term minimal cutset (MCS) refers to the smallest set of basic events in the fault tree whose occurrence is sufficient to cause the CSL+1 failure condition. Table D-1 lists all the cutsets in this example.

D.1.1.1 Identify the CSL+1 conditions. The CSL+1 condition is shown as a dual order MCS which contains a basic event that is considered as latent for more than one flight.

D.1.1.2 Group the dual order minimal cutsets.

(a) Group those CSL+1 conditions that contain the same latent failure. For each group, assume that latent failure has occurred, and sum the remaining active failures probabilities. For each group, the sum of the active failure probabilities should be on the order of 1 x 10-5 per flight hour or less. This is intended to show the residual risk safety objective of § 25.1309(b)(5)(ii).

(b) Group those CSL+1 that contain the same active basic event. For each group, sum the remaining latent failure probabilities. For each group, the sum of the latent basic events probability should not exceed 1/1000. This is intended to show the limit latency risk safety objective of § 25.1309(b)(5)(iii).

D.1.1.3 The sum of all the MCS should be on the order of 1 x 10-9 per flight hour or less in order to show § 25.1309(b)(1) compliance.

D.1.2 Alternative Method for Step D.1.1.2(a). An alternative but more conservative method is to assume a latent failure has occurred and perform step D.1.1.2(a) for each combination and show that the top event average probability is on the order of 1 x 10-5 per flight hour or less. Run the calculations for each and every latent failure.

D.1.3 Results. The results of the limit latency and residual risk analysis are provided in table D-1.

AC 25.1309-1B · D-1Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

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75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

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