FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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3.1.5 Catastrophic. A failure condition that would result in multiple fatalities, usually with the loss of the airplane.

Note 1: A failure condition that would prevent continued safe flight and landing should be classified as catastrophic unless otherwise defined in other specific ACs.

Note 2: For the purpose of performing a safety assessment, “multiple fatalities” means two or more fatalities.

3.2 Qualitative Probability Terms. The probability terms used in § 25.1309 and in this AC are defined in paragraphs 3.2.1 through 3.2.4 below. These terms and definitions have become commonly accepted as aids to engineering judgment when using qualitative analyses to determine compliance with § 25.1309(b).

Note: The definitions provided for probable, remote, extremely remote, and extremely improbable failure conditions are the same as those found in § 25.4.

3.2.1 Probable Failure Condition. A failure condition that is anticipated to occur one or more times during the entire operational life of each airplane of a given type.

3.2.2 Remote Failure Condition. A failure condition that is not anticipated to occur to each airplane of a given type during its entire operational life, but which may occur several times during the total operational life of a number of airplanes of a given type.

3.2.3 Extremely Remote Failure Condition. A failure condition that is not anticipated to occur to each airplane of a given type during its entire operational life, but which may occur a few times during the total operational life of all airplanes of a given type.

3.2.4 Extremely Improbable Failure Condition. A failure condition that is not anticipated to occur during the total operational life of all airplanes of a given type.

AC 25.1309-1B · 3-2Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

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