FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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amenities, passenger entertainment systems, in-flight telephones, and so forth, whose failure or improper functioning should not affect the safety of the airplane. In other words, the types of systems addressed by § 25.1309(a)(2) should be designed so that the severity of their functional failures has “no safety effect.” (See paragraph 3.1.1 of this AC for the definition of “no safety effect.”) Therefore, the qualification requirements for such equipment, systems, and installations can be reduced to the necessary tests for showing that their normal or abnormal functioning does not adversely affect the proper functioning of the equipment, systems, or installations covered by § 25.1309(a)(1), or the safety of the airplane or its occupants. Examples of adverse effects include fire, explosion, exposing passengers to high voltages, and so forth. The FAA expects normal installation practices to result in sufficiently obvious isolation of the impacts of such equipment on safety that substantiation can be based on a relatively simple qualitative installation evaluation. If the possible failure effects and their evaluation are questionable, or isolation between systems is provided by complex means, then more formal structured evaluation methods or a design change may be necessary.

5.3 Compliance with § 25.1309(b). Section 25.1309(b)(1) requires that the airplane’s systems and associated components, as installed, and considered both separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that any catastrophic failure condition is extremely improbable and does not result from a single failure. Section 25.1309(b)(2) requires that any hazardous failure condition is extremely remote, and § 25.1309(b)(3) requires that any major failure condition is remote. An analysis should consider the application of the fail-safe design concept described in paragraph 2.2 of this AC. The analysis should give special attention to ensuring the effective use of design techniques that would prevent single failures or other events from damaging or otherwise adversely affecting more than one redundant system channel or more than one system performing operationally similar functions. Additionally, § 25.1309(b)(4) requires the applicant to eliminate significant latent failures (SLFs) (see definition in paragraph 1.5.26 of this AC) to the extent practical, and provides criteria for accepting those SLFs that cannot be practically eliminated. Section 25.1309(b)(5) applies to the catastrophic failure conditions that result from two failures, either of which could be latent for more than one flight. The failure conditions addressed by § 25.1309(b)(5) are a subset of the failure conditions addressed in § 25.1309(b)(4).

5.3.1 General. Appendix C of this AC provides an overview of the typical safety assessment process. Compliance with the requirements of § 25.1309(b) should be shown by safety analyses. Where necessary, the failure effects should be substantiated by appropriate ground, flight, or simulator tests. Failure conditions should be identified, and their effects assessed. The maximum allowable probability of the occurrence of each failure condition is determined from the failure condition’s effects. When assessing failure conditions, appropriate analysis considerations should be accounted for. Any analysis should consider the following:

AC 25.1309-1B · 5-2Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

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