FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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Printed page 7-6

PDF page 46 of 75

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7.6.2 The details of how to calculate the average probability per flight hour for a failure condition are given in appendix F of this AC and in SAE ARP 4761.

7.6.3 If the probability of a subject failure condition occurring during a typical flight of mean duration for the airplane type divided by the flight’s mean duration in hours is likely to be significantly different from the predicted average rate of occurrence of that failure condition during the entire operational life of all airplanes of that type, then a better model of the flight of average risk must be used. For example, the loss of consumable material (for example, fluid leakage) may become a critical failure condition for a flight that is longer than the flight of mean duration.

7.6.4 For various reasons, component failure rate data are not typically precise enough to enable accurate estimates of the probabilities of failure conditions. This results in some degree of uncertainty, as indicated by the wide line in figure 4-1 of this AC, and the expression “on the order of” in the descriptions of the quantitative probability terms that are provided above. (See paragraph 3.3 of this AC.) When calculating the estimated probability of each failure condition, this uncertainty should be accounted for in a conservative way that does not compromise safety.

7.7 Integrated Systems.

7.7.1 Both physical and functional interconnections between systems have been a feature of airplane design for many years. Section 25.1309(b) accounts for this in requiring systems to be considered in relation to other systems. Provided the interfaces between systems are relatively few and simple, and hence readily understandable, compliance may often be shown through a series of system safety assessments (SSA). Each SSA deals with a particular failure condition (or more likely a group of failure conditions) associated with a system and, where necessary, accounts for failures arising at the interface with other systems. However, where the systems and their interfaces become more complex and extensive, the task of showing compliance may become more complex. It is therefore essential that the means of compliance are considered early in the design phase to ensure that the design can be supported by a viable safety assessment strategy. Aspects of the guidance material that should be given particular consideration are as follows:

7.7.1.1 Planning the proposed means of compliance. This should include development assurance activities to mitigate the occurrence and effects of errors in the design.

7.7.1.2 Considering the importance of architectural design in limiting the impact and propagation of failures.

7.7.1.3 The potential for common cause failures and cascading failure effects and the possible need to assess combinations of multiple lower level failure conditions. (For example, multiple minor and/or major failure conditions can lead up to a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition).

AC 25.1309-1B · 7-6Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

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