FAA source text, reformatted for reading. Page boundaries and paragraph numbers are retained.
7.6.2 The details of how to calculate the average probability per flight hour for a failure condition are given in appendix F of this AC and in SAE ARP 4761.
7.6.3 If the probability of a subject failure condition occurring during a typical flight of mean duration for the airplane type divided by the flight’s mean duration in hours is likely to be significantly different from the predicted average rate of occurrence of that failure condition during the entire operational life of all airplanes of that type, then a better model of the flight of average risk must be used. For example, the loss of consumable material (for example, fluid leakage) may become a critical failure condition for a flight that is longer than the flight of mean duration.
7.6.4 For various reasons, component failure rate data are not typically precise enough to enable accurate estimates of the probabilities of failure conditions. This results in some degree of uncertainty, as indicated by the wide line in figure 4-1 of this AC, and the expression “on the order of” in the descriptions of the quantitative probability terms that are provided above. (See paragraph 3.3 of this AC.) When calculating the estimated probability of each failure condition, this uncertainty should be accounted for in a conservative way that does not compromise safety.
7.7 Integrated Systems.
7.7.1 Both physical and functional interconnections between systems have been a feature of airplane design for many years. Section 25.1309(b) accounts for this in requiring systems to be considered in relation to other systems. Provided the interfaces between systems are relatively few and simple, and hence readily understandable, compliance may often be shown through a series of system safety assessments (SSA). Each SSA deals with a particular failure condition (or more likely a group of failure conditions) associated with a system and, where necessary, accounts for failures arising at the interface with other systems. However, where the systems and their interfaces become more complex and extensive, the task of showing compliance may become more complex. It is therefore essential that the means of compliance are considered early in the design phase to ensure that the design can be supported by a viable safety assessment strategy. Aspects of the guidance material that should be given particular consideration are as follows:
7.7.1.1 Planning the proposed means of compliance. This should include development assurance activities to mitigate the occurrence and effects of errors in the design.
7.7.1.2 Considering the importance of architectural design in limiting the impact and propagation of failures.
7.7.1.3 The potential for common cause failures and cascading failure effects and the possible need to assess combinations of multiple lower level failure conditions. (For example, multiple minor and/or major failure conditions can lead up to a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition).
