FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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• RTCA, Inc., Document DO-356, Airworthiness Security Methods and

Considerations. • SAE ARP 4754, Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems. • SAE ARP 4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment.

1.5 Definitions. The following definitions apply to the system design and analysis requirements of § 25.1309 and the guidance material in this AC. See also § 25.4 for common term definitions used in part 25. Some of the following definitions are specific to the system design and analysis requirements of § 25.1309 and the guidance material in this AC. Some of the following definitions may have a different meaning when they are used in other regulations or ACs. There are no defined terms within this section for which standard dictionary definitions apply.

1.5.1 Analysis. The terms “analysis” and “assessment” are used throughout this AC. The two terms are to some extent interchangeable. However, “analysis” generally implies a more specific, more detailed evaluation, while “assessment” may be a more general or broader evaluation but may include one or more types of analysis. In practice, the meaning of each term comes from the specific application, for example, fault tree analysis, Markov analysis, preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA), and so forth.

1.5.2 At Risk Time. The period of time during which the aircraft may be subject to the failure effect under analysis.

1.5.3 Assessment. See the definition of “analysis” above.

1.5.4 Average Probability per Flight Hour. For the purpose of this AC, this term is the quotient of the number of times the subject failure condition is predicted to occur during the entire operating life of all airplanes of the type divided by the anticipated total operating hours of all airplanes of that type. Please note that the average probability per flight hour is normally calculated as the probability of a failure condition occurring during a typical flight of mean duration divided by that mean duration.

1.5.5 Catastrophic Single Latent Failure Plus One (CSL+1). A catastrophic failure condition that results from a combination of two failures, either of which could be latent for more than one flight.

AC 25.1309-1B · 1-8Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

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