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Aircraft & system safety / ARP4761A

System safety.

Understand the failure.
Shape the design.
Substantiate the conclusion.

We develop and review safety assessments for aircraft developers and systems suppliers. We help your team connect failure conditions, architecture decisions and safety requirements to the evidence needed for certification.

Ways to work together

FAA DER expertise · Systems and equipment

When to involve us

Work through the questions that affect the design.

Start with an early architecture, an assessment already in progress or a specific finding that needs resolution.

See how we approach a case
Can the proposed architecture meet its safety objectives?
Assess failure combinations, shared resources, monitoring and reconfiguration. Make the necessary independence and design constraints explicit.
Is the credit taken for protection justified?
Examine what a monitor detects, how quickly the system responds, what can defeat that response and how latent failures affect the assessment.
Do the analyses describe the same system?
Reconcile the safety assessment, fault trees, FMEA, supplier data and system description against an identified configuration and consistent assumptions.
What still needs to close before the next review?
Identify missing evidence, unresolved assumptions and the safety impact of design changes. Turn material findings into specific engineering actions.

Assessment scope

From failure conditions
to substantiated safety conclusions.

Our approach is grounded in ARP4761A and coordinated with development assurance. We agree the activities and evidence around the certification basis, design maturity and your team’s responsibilities.

01 / Establish the objectives

Define the failure conditions.

Assess the effects on the aircraft, crew and occupants across relevant operating conditions and flight phases. Record the basis for the classifications and the assumptions that need confirmation.

AFHA & SFHA Assessment scope and outputs

Aircraft Functional Hazard Assessment addresses aircraft functions. System Functional Hazard Assessment addresses system functions in their aircraft and interface context.

Outputs: failure-condition worksheets, effects and classification rationale, safety objectives, substantiation references and an assumption register.

02 / Assess the architecture

Turn objectives into requirements.

Evaluate how the proposed architecture addresses the failure conditions. Examine dependencies and failure combinations, allocate objectives and derive requirements for the design.

PASA & PSSA Assessment scope and outputs

Preliminary Aircraft Safety Assessment addresses the aircraft architecture and system interactions. Preliminary System Safety Assessment addresses the system architecture and lower-level allocations.

Outputs: preliminary analyses, probability allocations, safety requirements, FDAL/IDAL rationale, independence provisions and monitoring or latent-failure constraints.

03 / Evaluate the implementation

Support the conclusion with evidence.

Assess the implemented design against the safety objectives and requirements. Bring together the updated analyses, verified design features, installation evidence and confirmed assumptions.

ASA & SSA Assessment scope and outputs

System Safety Assessment evaluates the implemented system. Aircraft Safety Assessment combines system evidence with the additional aircraft-level assessment needed for interactions and combined effects.

Outputs: final assessment reports, results against objectives and requirements, references to verification evidence and the disposition of outstanding safety issues.

These activities develop together. New findings and design changes can require earlier assumptions, requirements and analyses to be revisited.

Supporting analyses

Examine the causes,
dependencies and evidence.

We develop or review the supporting analyses within the agreed scope and coordinate specialist inputs where needed.

The assessment must address both the numerical objectives and the design provisions on which the argument depends.

FTA
FMEA / FMES
Failure combinations, modes and effects

Fault Tree Analysis examines combinations leading to a failure condition. FMEA examines individual failure modes and their effects; FMES provides a traceable summary for higher-level analysis.

We review the logic, rate sources, exposure assumptions and consistency between analyses. Monitoring and architectural protection need to be represented without double counting their benefit.

Typical outputsFault trees and cut sets, FMEA/FMES worksheets, documented assumptions, source references and results against allocated objectives.

CMA
ZSA / PRA
Independence and common cause considerations

Common Mode Analysis examines the independence claimed between functions or items, including shared resources and common development, manufacturing, maintenance or operating errors.

Zonal Safety Analysis addresses installation interactions within and between aircraft zones. Particular Risk Analysis addresses individual threats that can affect several systems or structures together.

Typical outputsIndependence evaluations, installation or risk-specific records, mitigation requirements and supporting findings and closure evidence. Specialist responsibilities are agreed for the programme.

CEACascading effects and shared resources

Follow the direct and indirect effects of an initiating failure through connected systems. Consider how power, data, processing or other shared resources can affect several aircraft functions.

Typical outputsInitiating-failure and dependency records, propagated effects, assumptions and findings returned to the relevant aircraft or system assessment.

FDAL
IDAL
Development assurance allocation

Connect the failure conditions and architecture to Function and Item Development Assurance Level assignments. Evaluate functional failure sets, independence principles and the rationale supporting any architecture-based allocation.

Typical outputsFDAL/IDAL assignment records, supporting rationale and independence requirements. Evidence of assurance achievement comes from the coordinated development processes.

Technical foundation: SAE ARP4761A, used with the applicable authority guidance and the programme’s agreed development assurance approach.

A practical example

Taking credit for a monitor.

An illustrative flight-control case. The classification, design limits and required evidence depend on the aircraft and its operating context.

Define what must be detected.

A command-to-position comparison may not detect an erroneous command that the surface follows correctly. Identify the failure modes covered and the validity of the measured signal. Establish the detection threshold and total response time needed to limit the aircraft effect. Examine failures that could defeat both the command function and its monitoring.

Record: monitoring requirements, assumptions, independence conditions and the basis for the timing limits.

Follow the response through the actual design.

Trace the isolation request through the control and actuation path. Determine whether the drive is removed, what happens to the surface afterwards and whether the remaining control capability is adequate. Include loss or latent failure of the protective response.

Record: fault-response requirements, affected failure combinations, resulting aircraft effects and any operating or maintenance constraints.

Link the claim to evidence.

Define the analyses and tests needed to substantiate the claimed detection and response. Relevant evidence may include fault insertion, timing measurements and integration testing, tied to the assessed configuration and operating conditions.

Record: requirement-to-evidence links, coverage and limitations, test or analysis results, and unresolved findings.

The assessment conclusion: take credit only for the protection supported by the design and evidence. Where an assumption remains open, identify the work needed to substantiate it and its effect on the conclusion.

Working through a similar architecture question?

What the work produces

A package your team can
use, review and maintain.

Agree the deliverables at the start. Keep their design baseline, assumptions, source data and outstanding work identifiable as the programme develops.

Assessment & analysis package

The agreed assessments, analysis models, worksheets and results, with a clear scope and traceable supporting references.

Use it to explain how the design addresses each assessed failure condition and safety requirement.

Requirements & assumptions

Derived safety requirements, allocations, assurance rationale and independence provisions, with assumptions assigned for confirmation.

Use it to carry the safety conclusions into system, software, hardware and supplier development.

Evidence & findings records

Links to verification evidence, material review findings, actions and closure rationale, with any remaining limitations visible.

Use it to assess readiness for the next review and understand the safety impact of change.

Scope can also include safety planning, safety-derived maintenance tasks and interval constraints, candidate certification maintenance requirements, and safety inputs to Master Minimum Equipment List assessments, where applicable. Records may be combined or referenced to suit the programme.

Working together

Start with the support
your programme needs.

We agree the technical question, available inputs, responsibilities and expected output before starting the work.

A defined question

Focused safety review

For an architecture decision, assessment package or unresolved technical issue.

Start with
The relevant design description, assessment and the question you need answered.
You receive
A prioritised set of findings, their technical significance and recommended actions.

An agreed body of work

Assessment development

For a new assessment or an update to an existing safety package.

Start with
The agreed scope, aircraft or system baseline, available data and programme interfaces.
You receive
The agreed reports, analyses and requirements records, with assumptions and open work identified.

Continuity through development

Ongoing programme support

For teams that need regular safety involvement as the design and evidence evolve.

Start with
Your work plan, review milestones, team responsibilities and current priorities.
You receive
Ongoing technical support, coordinated assessment updates and help resolving findings.

Tell us where your programme stands.

The aircraft or system, its stage of development and the safety question you are working through are enough to begin a conversation.

Safety for your aircraft and certification basis.

Explore Part 23, Part 25, Part 27, eVTOL and new or novel designs, with the safety questions, evidence and guidance for each.

Explore the aircraft pathways →

Explore the technical basis

Selected guidance, standards and practical context.

ARP4761A reference System safety guidance FHA to PSSA to SSA guide All technical resources