Aircraft / Safety / Certification

Safety for the aircraft
you’re building.

Conventional aircraft. Rotorcraft. eVTOL.
New ideas with real engineering questions.

We connect the certification basis, aircraft architecture and safety evidence. Explore the approach for your programme, with the relevant guidance close at hand.

Explore your programme

Choose your starting point

Where does your programme fit?

New or novel features can arise within any aircraft category.

Your programme / Part 27

Part 27 rotorcraft

Connect the failure assessment to rotorcraft behaviour, flight phase, crew capability and the actual protective features of the system.

FAA / Regulation and amendment

Identify the applicable amendment of §27.1309 together with the affected flight-control, equipment and operating requirements. IFR approval can add further considerations, including Appendix B where applicable.

Read §27.1309 on this site

FAA / Rotorcraft guidance

Use AC 27-1B incorporating Changes 1–9. Its AC 27.1309B guidance addresses Amendment 27-51 and starts at printed page F-30.1, PDF page 591. Earlier guidance remains in the same publication for earlier bases.

Open the Amendment 27-51 guidance

Our engineering approach

Questions the safety work
needs to answer.

  1. How does the effect change with flight condition?

    Examine hover, low-speed operation, climb, cruise, approach and landing, together with the operating envelope and approval sought.

  2. What happens after an erroneous command or loss of control?

    Trace control authority, actuator response, detection, isolation and remaining capability. Include the physical response after electrical isolation.

  3. Is the claimed pilot response credible?

    Substantiate cueing, workload, available response time and recovery assumptions. Coordinate the safety argument with handling-qualities and flight-test evidence.

  4. Do the interfaces preserve the safety argument?

    Check sensors, electrical supplies, autoflight interfaces, flight-control dependencies, installation risks and maintenance assumptions.

Read with the basis in view

Useful regulations and guidance.

Source texts and our explanations are kept separate.

Start a useful conversation

Bring the aircraft and the question.

Bring the rotorcraft certification basis, intended operation, flight-control or equipment definition, and the failure effect or crew-response assumption under review.

Across the programme

Carry the safety argument
through development.

Our approach draws on ARP4761A and ARP4754B. We agree the methods, editions and extent of application against the programme’s certification basis.

01 / Establish

Functions, effects and objectives

Define aircraft and system functions, operating conditions, failure effects, classifications and assumptions.

AFHA / SFHA →
02 / Develop

Architecture and safety requirements

Assess interactions, failure combinations and independence. Derive requirements and coordinate the assurance allocations.

PASA / PSSA →
03 / Integrate

Requirements and development assurance

Connect requirements validation, design verification, software and hardware assurance, supplier interfaces and configuration control.

Systems engineering →
04 / Substantiate

The implemented design and its evidence

Reconcile analysis and verification, close assumptions and carry safety-related operating and maintenance provisions into the final package.

ASA / SSA →

These activities iterate as the design develops. The supporting FTA, FMEA/FMES, common-cause and dependency work follows the questions raised by the architecture.

Source editions, applicability and the scope of our support

Source editions checked on 16 November 2026. The selected regulations, guidance and publication records support the distinctions shown here; the engineering questions and work-product outlines are Aerospace Consulting’s explanations.

Confirm the certification basis, amendment levels, accepted means and current source status for each programme. FAA and EASA terminology, categories and safety objectives need their own applicability assessment.

Consulting support is agreed to suit the programme. Any delegated approval must be within the specific authority granted for that work, including any additional authorisation required for a special-class project.

FAA AC 20-174 recognises ARP4754A. EASA CM-DASA-002 and the final SC-VTOL MoC provide their own scoped treatment of later development-assurance guidance. Use the applicable authority position when agreeing editions.

CM-DASA-002 addresses aircraft and system development assurance and its interfaces with safety assessment. The safety assessment process itself and item-specific software and hardware assurance are outside its scope.