Aircraft / Safety / Certification

Safety for the aircraft
you’re building.

Conventional aircraft. Rotorcraft. eVTOL.
New ideas with real engineering questions.

We connect the certification basis, aircraft architecture and safety evidence. Explore the approach for your programme, with the relevant guidance close at hand.

Explore your programme

Choose your starting point

Where does your programme fit?

New or novel features can arise within any aircraft category.

Your programme / New & novel

New and novel designs

New technology can appear in any aircraft category. Identify where a feature challenges the existing assumptions, requirements or means of compliance, then develop the evidence and authority position around that gap.

FAA / A conventional category basis

Where the applicable airworthiness standards do not adequately address a novel or unusual design feature, §21.16 provides for special conditions. Establish the affected requirements and the specific safety gap.

Read §21.16

FAA / Special-class powered-lift

Under §21.17(b), unique or novel features are addressed through appropriate alternate or additional airworthiness criteria. AC 21.17-4 §§7.2–7.3 explains this process and excludes §21.16 special conditions from that special-class basis.

Read the alternate-criteria process

Our engineering approach

Questions the safety work
needs to answer.

  1. Which established assumption no longer holds?

    Describe the function, operating limits and novel feature. Identify gaps in failure experience, accepted methods, human roles, architecture or verification capability.

  2. What could the feature affect beyond its own boundary?

    Evaluate dependencies, cascading effects and interactions with existing protections. Include energy systems, automation and aircraft-wide services where relevant.

  3. What must be agreed before the evidence programme grows?

    Propose the criteria, objectives, means of compliance, responsibilities and limitations. Resolve the difficult authority questions early enough to influence the design.

  4. What makes the new method credible?

    Define validation, representativeness, uncertainty, coverage and independent review for new tools or models. For AI/ML, establish the use case and specific assurance needs.

Read with the basis in view

Useful regulations and guidance.

Source texts and our explanations are kept separate.

Start a useful conversation

Bring the aircraft and the question.

Bring a clear description of the novel feature, the proposed certification basis, assumptions that may no longer hold, and the questions already raised with the authority.

Across the programme

Carry the safety argument
through development.

Our approach draws on ARP4761A and ARP4754B. We agree the methods, editions and extent of application against the programme’s certification basis.

01 / Establish

Functions, effects and objectives

Define aircraft and system functions, operating conditions, failure effects, classifications and assumptions.

AFHA / SFHA →
02 / Develop

Architecture and safety requirements

Assess interactions, failure combinations and independence. Derive requirements and coordinate the assurance allocations.

PASA / PSSA →
03 / Integrate

Requirements and development assurance

Connect requirements validation, design verification, software and hardware assurance, supplier interfaces and configuration control.

Systems engineering →
04 / Substantiate

The implemented design and its evidence

Reconcile analysis and verification, close assumptions and carry safety-related operating and maintenance provisions into the final package.

ASA / SSA →

These activities iterate as the design develops. The supporting FTA, FMEA/FMES, common-cause and dependency work follows the questions raised by the architecture.

Source editions, applicability and the scope of our support

Source editions checked on 16 November 2026. The selected regulations, guidance and publication records support the distinctions shown here; the engineering questions and work-product outlines are Aerospace Consulting’s explanations.

Confirm the certification basis, amendment levels, accepted means and current source status for each programme. FAA and EASA terminology, categories and safety objectives need their own applicability assessment.

Consulting support is agreed to suit the programme. Any delegated approval must be within the specific authority granted for that work, including any additional authorisation required for a special-class project.

FAA AC 20-174 recognises ARP4754A. EASA CM-DASA-002 and the final SC-VTOL MoC provide their own scoped treatment of later development-assurance guidance. Use the applicable authority position when agreeing editions.

CM-DASA-002 addresses aircraft and system development assurance and its interfaces with safety assessment. The safety assessment process itself and item-specific software and hardware assurance are outside its scope.