Aircraft / Safety / Certification

Safety for the aircraft
you’re building.

Conventional aircraft. Rotorcraft. eVTOL.
New ideas with real engineering questions.

We connect the certification basis, aircraft architecture and safety evidence. Explore the approach for your programme, with the relevant guidance close at hand.

Explore your programme

Choose your starting point

Where does your programme fit?

New or novel features can arise within any aircraft category.

Your programme / Part 25

Part 25 aircraft

Develop the aircraft and system safety argument together, from failure-condition effects and architectural decisions to substantiated compliance evidence.

FAA / System safety

Start with the applicable amendment of §25.1309 and the other affected requirements. AC 25.1309-1B provides guidance on system design and analysis, including significant latent failures and supporting evidence.

Read AC 25.1309-1B on this site

EASA / An EASA certification programme

Identify the agreed CS-25 amendment, AMC 25.1309 and project-specific arrangements. Keep the FAA and EASA compliance positions identifiable where a programme involves both authorities.

Selected AMC 25.1309 reference

Our engineering approach

Questions the safety work
needs to answer.

  1. Are the failure conditions complete?

    Consider combined functions and aircraft interactions, normal and abnormal operating conditions, crew effects and the basis for each classification.

  2. What protects against single and common failures?

    Trace the actual control, sensing, power and monitoring paths. Examine shared resources and common development or installation vulnerabilities.

  3. How is latent exposure controlled?

    Identify significant latent failures, detection opportunities, exposure assumptions and any inspection or maintenance provisions used in the argument.

  4. Does the evidence match the assessed configuration?

    Reconcile architecture, requirements, fault trees, FMEA, assurance allocations, verification results and continued-airworthiness provisions.

Read with the basis in view

Useful regulations and guidance.

Source texts and our explanations are kept separate.

Start a useful conversation

Bring the aircraft and the question.

Bring the applicable amendment, system architecture, FHA and the safety conclusion or compliance issue your team needs to resolve.

Across the programme

Carry the safety argument
through development.

Our approach draws on ARP4761A and ARP4754B. We agree the methods, editions and extent of application against the programme’s certification basis.

01 / Establish

Functions, effects and objectives

Define aircraft and system functions, operating conditions, failure effects, classifications and assumptions.

AFHA / SFHA →
02 / Develop

Architecture and safety requirements

Assess interactions, failure combinations and independence. Derive requirements and coordinate the assurance allocations.

PASA / PSSA →
03 / Integrate

Requirements and development assurance

Connect requirements validation, design verification, software and hardware assurance, supplier interfaces and configuration control.

Systems engineering →
04 / Substantiate

The implemented design and its evidence

Reconcile analysis and verification, close assumptions and carry safety-related operating and maintenance provisions into the final package.

ASA / SSA →

These activities iterate as the design develops. The supporting FTA, FMEA/FMES, common-cause and dependency work follows the questions raised by the architecture.

Source editions, applicability and the scope of our support

Source editions checked on 16 November 2026. The selected regulations, guidance and publication records support the distinctions shown here; the engineering questions and work-product outlines are Aerospace Consulting’s explanations.

Confirm the certification basis, amendment levels, accepted means and current source status for each programme. FAA and EASA terminology, categories and safety objectives need their own applicability assessment.

Consulting support is agreed to suit the programme. Any delegated approval must be within the specific authority granted for that work, including any additional authorisation required for a special-class project.

FAA AC 20-174 recognises ARP4754A. EASA CM-DASA-002 and the final SC-VTOL MoC provide their own scoped treatment of later development-assurance guidance. Use the applicable authority position when agreeing editions.

CM-DASA-002 addresses aircraft and system development assurance and its interfaces with safety assessment. The safety assessment process itself and item-specific software and hardware assurance are outside its scope.