Aircraft / Safety / Certification

Safety for the aircraft
you’re building.

Conventional aircraft. Rotorcraft. eVTOL.
New ideas with real engineering questions.

We connect the certification basis, aircraft architecture and safety evidence. Explore the approach for your programme, with the relevant guidance close at hand.

Explore your programme

Choose your starting point

Where does your programme fit?

New or novel features can arise within any aircraft category.

Your programme / eVTOL & AAM

eVTOL & advanced air mobility

Bring aircraft safety, propulsion, flight controls, energy and development assurance together early. Establish the certification route from the configuration and intended operation.

FAA / Powered-lift

The special-class route uses §21.17(b). AC 21.17-4 provides procedures and accepted criteria for eligible powered-lift. Its Appendix A criteria cover up to 12,500 lb, six passenger seats and battery-electric engines driving propellers; other designs can need alternate or additional criteria. Identify whether essential performance, increased performance, or both approvals are sought.

FAA powered-lift guidance and scope

EASA / Small-category VCA

Use SC-VTOL Issue 2 and the applicable final Means of Compliance. Its small-category scope includes up to nine passenger seats and a maximum certified take-off mass of 5,700 kg; confirm the remaining applicability limits. Category Enhanced addresses continued safe flight and landing; Category Basic addresses a controlled emergency landing. Retain the selected issues and programme agreements.

SC-VTOL and final MoC publications

Record the FAA performance approval and EASA category separately. Each framework sets its own objectives and applicability.

What the latest EASA MoC means for this work

MOC-5 Issue 2 updates VTOL.2510 guidance to reference ARP4754B and ARP4761A. Its common mode guidance includes IDAL A items; assurance allocation remains subject to its stated category conditions. Agree the development-assurance scope with EASA early.

It also addresses latent failures and certification credit from simulation benches and test rigs. Our evidence planning connects these topics to the design, test configuration and assumptions being substantiated.

Read MOC-5 Issue 2 · FINAL

Our engineering approach

Questions the safety work
needs to answer.

  1. What remains controllable in each flight phase?

    Assess hover, transition and wing-borne flight, where applicable. Connect loss or erroneous output of lift, thrust or control functions to the aircraft response and achievable safe outcome.

  2. Which resources can affect several functions together?

    Examine shared energy, cooling, power conversion, data, sensing and computing. Trace propagation and dependencies between propulsion and flight control.

  3. What supports the monitoring and reconfiguration credit?

    Define detection coverage, isolation, response time and remaining capability. Include latent failures, common modes, dispatch states and degraded configurations.

  4. Can the evidence support the aircraft-level conclusion?

    Link supplier assessments to aircraft objectives. Identify representative rig configurations, model validity, fault coverage, flight evidence and the assumptions each result can close.

Read with the basis in view

Useful regulations and guidance.

Source texts and our explanations are kept separate.

Start a useful conversation

Bring the aircraft and the question.

Bring the aircraft concept, intended operation, proposed FAA/EASA route, flight-phase definitions, major shared resources and the current safety or assurance plan.

eVTOL / An illustrative safety question

Several lift units.
One shared cooling circuit.

A fictional example of how an aircraft-level question becomes design requirements and evidence. It assigns no failure classification or assurance level.

Start with the available thrust and control.

A fictional eVTOL has several lift units connected to one cooling circuit. If that circuit is lost during transition, determine which units are affected, how quickly their capability changes and what the aircraft can still do. Examine the relevant flight phases, conditions and crew response.

Across the programme

Carry the safety argument
through development.

Our approach draws on ARP4761A and ARP4754B. We agree the methods, editions and extent of application against the programme’s certification basis.

01 / Establish

Functions, effects and objectives

Define aircraft and system functions, operating conditions, failure effects, classifications and assumptions.

AFHA / SFHA →
02 / Develop

Architecture and safety requirements

Assess interactions, failure combinations and independence. Derive requirements and coordinate the assurance allocations.

PASA / PSSA →
03 / Integrate

Requirements and development assurance

Connect requirements validation, design verification, software and hardware assurance, supplier interfaces and configuration control.

Systems engineering →
04 / Substantiate

The implemented design and its evidence

Reconcile analysis and verification, close assumptions and carry safety-related operating and maintenance provisions into the final package.

ASA / SSA →

These activities iterate as the design develops. The supporting FTA, FMEA/FMES, common-cause and dependency work follows the questions raised by the architecture.

Source editions, applicability and the scope of our support

Source editions checked on 16 November 2026. The selected regulations, guidance and publication records support the distinctions shown here; the engineering questions and work-product outlines are Aerospace Consulting’s explanations.

Confirm the certification basis, amendment levels, accepted means and current source status for each programme. FAA and EASA terminology, categories and safety objectives need their own applicability assessment.

Consulting support is agreed to suit the programme. Any delegated approval must be within the specific authority granted for that work, including any additional authorisation required for a special-class project.

FAA AC 20-174 recognises ARP4754A. EASA CM-DASA-002 and the final SC-VTOL MoC provide their own scoped treatment of later development-assurance guidance. Use the applicable authority position when agreeing editions.

CM-DASA-002 addresses aircraft and system development assurance and its interfaces with safety assessment. The safety assessment process itself and item-specific software and hardware assurance are outside its scope.