Aircraft / Safety / Certification

Safety for the aircraft
you’re building.

Conventional aircraft. Rotorcraft. eVTOL.
New ideas with real engineering questions.

We connect the certification basis, aircraft architecture and safety evidence. Explore the approach for your programme, with the relevant guidance close at hand.

Explore your programme

Choose your starting point

Where does your programme fit?

New or novel features can arise within any aircraft category.

Your programme / Part 23

Part 23 aircraft

Build the safety approach around the aircraft’s certification basis, its operating characteristics and the functions being introduced or changed.

FAA / Modern Part 23

For an Amendment 23-64 or later basis, §23.2510 sets the equipment and systems safety objectives. Select the applicable FAA-accepted means of compliance, including its revision and any FAA modifications.

Read §23.2510

FAA / Earlier certification bases

Earlier projects may retain §23.1309. AC 23.1309-1E addresses amendments through 23-62. Establish the actual amendment and scope of a change before selecting that guidance.

AC 23.1309-1E · earlier amendments

Our engineering approach

Questions the safety work
needs to answer.

  1. What changes the aircraft-level effect?

    Consider aircraft level and performance, flight phase, operating environment, crew capability and the intended use of the affected functions.

  2. Which functions share the same vulnerability?

    Examine shared power, sensors, data, processors and interfaces, including interactions between flight controls, propulsion, displays and automation.

  3. What supports the assurance allocation?

    Connect failure conditions, architecture, independence and development assurance. Make the assumptions behind any allocation explicit.

  4. What does the change invalidate?

    For an altered aircraft, identify affected interfaces, operating assumptions, assessments and verification evidence, alongside the certification-basis review.

Read with the basis in view

Useful regulations and guidance.

Source texts and our explanations are kept separate.

Start a useful conversation

Bring the aircraft and the question.

Bring the certification basis, the aircraft level and intended operation, the affected functions and any proposed changes to an existing design.

Across the programme

Carry the safety argument
through development.

Our approach draws on ARP4761A and ARP4754B. We agree the methods, editions and extent of application against the programme’s certification basis.

01 / Establish

Functions, effects and objectives

Define aircraft and system functions, operating conditions, failure effects, classifications and assumptions.

AFHA / SFHA →
02 / Develop

Architecture and safety requirements

Assess interactions, failure combinations and independence. Derive requirements and coordinate the assurance allocations.

PASA / PSSA →
03 / Integrate

Requirements and development assurance

Connect requirements validation, design verification, software and hardware assurance, supplier interfaces and configuration control.

Systems engineering →
04 / Substantiate

The implemented design and its evidence

Reconcile analysis and verification, close assumptions and carry safety-related operating and maintenance provisions into the final package.

ASA / SSA →

These activities iterate as the design develops. The supporting FTA, FMEA/FMES, common-cause and dependency work follows the questions raised by the architecture.

Source editions, applicability and the scope of our support

Source editions checked on 16 November 2026. The selected regulations, guidance and publication records support the distinctions shown here; the engineering questions and work-product outlines are Aerospace Consulting’s explanations.

Confirm the certification basis, amendment levels, accepted means and current source status for each programme. FAA and EASA terminology, categories and safety objectives need their own applicability assessment.

Consulting support is agreed to suit the programme. Any delegated approval must be within the specific authority granted for that work, including any additional authorisation required for a special-class project.

FAA AC 20-174 recognises ARP4754A. EASA CM-DASA-002 and the final SC-VTOL MoC provide their own scoped treatment of later development-assurance guidance. Use the applicable authority position when agreeing editions.

CM-DASA-002 addresses aircraft and system development assurance and its interfaces with safety assessment. The safety assessment process itself and item-specific software and hardware assurance are outside its scope.