14 CFR · AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: NORMAL CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT

§ 27.1309

Equipment, systems, and installations.

Text as of November 12, 2026Amendment 27-51Source checked 16 November 2026

The equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is required by this subchapter must be designed and installed to ensure that they perform their intended functions under any foreseeable operating condition. For any item of equipment or system whose failure has not been specifically addressed by another requirement in this chapter, the following requirements also apply:

(a) The design of each item of equipment, system, and installation must be analyzed separately and in relation to other rotorcraft systems and installations to determine and identify any failure that would affect the capability of the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to perform their duties in all operating conditions.

(b) Each item of equipment, system, and installation must be designed and installed so that:

(1) The occurrence of any catastrophic failure condition is extremely improbable;

(2) The occurrence of any major failure condition is no more than improbable; and

(3) For the occurrence of any other failure condition between major and catastrophic, the probability of the failure condition must be inversely proportional to its consequences.

(c) A means to alert the crew in the event of a failure must be provided when an unsafe system operating condition exists and to enable them to take corrective action. Systems, controls, and associated monitoring and crew alerting means must be designed to minimize crew errors that could create additional hazards.

(d) Compliance with the requirements of this section must be shown by analysis and, where necessary, by ground, flight, or simulator tests. The analysis must account for:

(1) Possible modes of failure, including malfunctions and misleading data and input from external sources;

(2) The effect of multiple failures and latent failures;

(3) The resulting effects on the rotorcraft and occupants, considering the stage of flight and operating conditions; and

(4) The crew alerting cues and the corrective action required.

[Amdt. 27-51, 88 FR 8737, Feb. 10, 2023]

About this text

Source: OFR/GPO eCFR. The wording is reproduced from the dated source, with formatting adapted for reading. The eCFR is an editorial compilation and is not the official legal edition of the CFR.

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Aerospace Consulting / Engineering context

Connect the rule to the design.

Read this section against the installed functions and their interaction with the rest of the rotorcraft. The assessment needs to connect failure effects, multiple and latent failures, crew response and the proposed design to the supporting analysis and testing.

01 / Define the assessment

Functions, conditions and effects

Identify the functions, operating conditions and failure conditions. Consider system interactions and equipment-specific requirements alongside this section.

02 / Explain the design

Architecture and safety requirements

Show how the design addresses the failure conditions. Record assumptions about independence, monitoring, latent exposure and crew action, and trace them into requirements.

03 / Close the evidence

Analysis, verification and configuration

Connect the safety conclusions to the implemented design and its evidence. Keep open actions, test coverage and the applicable configuration visible.

These are our explanatory notes. The rule text above remains separate. This section does not itself prescribe numerical probability targets or development assurance levels; the applicable basis and compliance approach need to be established for the programme.

Read alongside

Selected related requirements. This is a starting point, not a complete compliance checklist.

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