FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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Printed page 5-9

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other cases that require a flight crew alert, refer to § 25.1322 and other applicable system regulations.

5.4.4 Procedures for the flightcrew to follow after the occurrence of failures must be described in the FAA-approved AFM in accordance with §§ 25.1581 and 25.1585, or AFM revision or supplement.

5.4.5 To meet § 25.1309(c), even if operation or performance is unaffected or insignificantly affected at the time of failure, the applicant should ensure that the design provides any information necessary for the flightcrew to take any action or observe any precautions. Examples include reconfiguring a system, flightcrew awareness of a reduction in safety margins if flightcrew action is necessary, changing the flight plan or regime, making an unscheduled landing to reduce exposure to a more severe failure condition that would result from subsequent failures, or operational or environmental conditions. The applicant should also ensure that the design provides any information concerning unsafe system operating conditions if a failure must be corrected before a subsequent flight. Information and alerting indications may be inhibited during specific phases of flight where awareness or corrective action by the crew is considered more hazardous than no awareness or corrective action; for example, during critical flight phases like takeoff, or if operation or performance is unaffected or insignificantly affected.

5.4.6 The use of periodic maintenance or flightcrew checks to detect SLFs after they occur is undesirable and should not be used in place of practical and reliable failure monitoring and indications. Where such monitoring and indications cannot be accomplished, see paragraph 5.3.6 of this AC for guidance. Chapter 8 of this AC provides further guidance on the use of periodic maintenance or flightcrew checks. Comparison with similar, previously approved systems is sometimes helpful. However, if a new design solution allows practical and reliable failure monitoring and indications, this should be preferred in lieu of periodic maintenance or flightcrew checks.

5.4.7 Applicants should give particular attention to the placement of switches or other control devices, relative to one another, to minimize the potential for inadvertent incorrect flightcrew action, especially during emergencies or periods of high workload. Extra protection, such as the use of guarded switches, may sometimes be needed. See AC 25.1302-1 and other relevant ACs for additional guidance on these and other design attributes related to the avoidance and management of flightcrew error.

5.5 Compliance with § 25.1309(e). Section 25.1309(e) requires that certification maintenance requirements be established, as necessary, to prevent development of failure conditions described in § 25.1309(b), and that these requirements be included in the Airworthiness Limitations section (ALS) of the ICA required by § 25.1529. See chapter 8 of this AC for detailed guidance on establishing the required scheduled maintenance tasks. Once these tasks are established, they must be included in the ALS in accordance with paragraph (a)(6) of section H25.4 to appendix H, part 25.

AC 25.1309-1B · 5-9Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

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