FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

Start with the scope.

Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

The source, within reach.

Search within this AC, jump to a source page, or download the complete saved publication.

Download saved FAA PDF ↓

Find your starting point

What are you looking into?

Go directly to a useful part of the document.

Read the source

The document, within reach.

FAA source document

Printed page 1-1

PDF page 6 of 75

FAA source text, reformatted for reading. Page boundaries and paragraph numbers are retained.

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1 Purpose.

1.1.1 This AC describes acceptable means, but not the only means, for showing compliance with 14 CFR 25.1309, Equipment, systems, and installations. These means are intended to provide guidance to supplement the engineering and operational judgment that form the basis of any showing of compliance. The contents of this document do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This document is intended only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.

1.1.2 Revision B of this AC contains guidance based on rule changes to § 25.1309. This revision also improves upon the materials published in AC 25.1309-1A by providing more substantive guidance on safety analysis methods. It also implements Congressional instruction1 to emphasize clear applicant documentation of certain technical details and failure modes, and pilot response times to them.

1.2 Applicability.

1.2.1 Applicability of this AC.

1.2.1.1 The guidance in this AC is for airplane manufacturers, modifiers, foreign regulatory authorities, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aircraft Certification Service engineers and the Administrator’s designees.

1.2.1.2 Using this guidance as a means of compliance with § 25.1309 is voluntary only and not using it will not affect rights and obligations under existing statutes and regulations. The FAA will consider other methods of showing compliance that an applicant may elect to present. Terms such as “should,” “may,” and “must” are used only in the sense of ensuring applicability of this particular method of compliance when the acceptable method of compliance in this document is used. If the FAA becomes aware of circumstances in which following this AC would not result in compliance with the applicable regulations, the agency may require additional substantiation as the basis for finding compliance.

1.2.2 Applicability of § 25.1309.

1.2.2.1 Section 25.1309 is intended as a general requirement to be applied to any equipment or system as installed on the airplane, be it for type certification, operating rules, or optional, in addition to specific systems requirements, except as indicated below.

1 Section 115 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act of 2020.

AC 25.1309-1B · 1-1Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

Original FAA PDF ↗

Working through a certification question?

Bring the aircraft, the basis and the issue your team needs to resolve.

Discuss your programme →