FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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Printed page 8-1

PDF page 49 of 75

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CHAPTER 8. OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE CONSIDERATIONS

8.1 Overview. This AC addresses operational and maintenance considerations that are directly related to compliance with § 25.1309. Flightcrew and maintenance tasks related to compliance with § 25.1309 should be appropriate and reasonable. However, the FAA does not currently consider quantitative assessments of flightcrew errors to be feasible. Reasonable tasks are those that can be realistically anticipated to be performed correctly when they are required or scheduled. Paragraph 5.3.5 addresses the expected validation and verification tasks related to flightcrew mitigating actions during a safety assessment. In addition, based on experienced engineering and operational judgment, the discovery of obvious failures during normal operation or maintenance of the airplane may be assumed, even though identification of such failures is not the primary purpose of the operational or maintenance actions. During the safety assessment process associated with § 25.1309 compliance, useful information or instructions associated with the continued airworthiness of the airplane might be identified. This information should be made available to those compiling the ICA covered by § 25.1529.

8.2 Flightcrew Action. When assessing the ability of the flightcrew to cope with a failure condition, the information provided to the crew, the complexity of the required action, and pilot response time should be considered. When considering the information provided to the flightcrew, refer also to the guidance on § 25.1309(c) (paragraph 5.4 of this AC). Credit for flightcrew actions and consideration of flightcrew errors should be consistent with relevant service experience and acceptable human factors evaluations. If the evaluation indicates that a potential failure condition can be alleviated or overcome without jeopardizing other safety related flightcrew tasks and without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, credit may be taken for both qualitative and quantitative assessments. Similarly, credit may be taken for correct flightcrew performance of the periodic checks required to show compliance with § 25.1309(b), provided that performing such checks does not require exceptional pilot skill or strength and the overall flightcrew workload is not excessive. Flightcrew actions should be described in the AFM in compliance with § 25.1585. The applicant should provide a means to ensure the AFM contains all the required flightcrew actions used as mitigation in the hazard classification or to limit the exposure time of the failure condition.

8.3 Maintenance Action. The applicant’s safety assessment may take credit for the correct accomplishment of reasonable maintenance tasks, for both qualitative and quantitative assessments while also taking into consideration the effects of reasonably anticipated maintenance errors. The maintenance tasks required to show compliance with § 25.1309(b) and (e) should be established. In doing this, the maintenance scenarios in the following paragraphs 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 can be used.

AC 25.1309-1B · 8-1Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

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