FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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Printed page 8-2

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8.3.1 Certification Maintenance Requirements.

8.3.1.1 Periodic maintenance or flightcrew checks may be used to help show compliance with § 25.1309(b). These checks are used to (1) detect the presence of, and thereby limit the exposure time to, SLFs, or (2) detect an impending wear-out of an item whose failure is associated with a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition. Where such checks cannot be accepted as basic servicing or reasonably anticipated flightcrew actions, they should be identified as candidate certification maintenance requirements (CCMRs) or required flightcrew actions in the SSA. Advisory Circular 25-19A details the handling of CCMRs and the selection of CMRs. In compliance with § 25.1309(e), CMRs are included in the ALS of the ICA. Required flightcrew actions must be included in the approved section of the AFM.

8.3.1.2 Quantitative probability analysis of failure conditions, test data, relevant service experience, or other acceptable method should be used to determine check intervals. Because quantitative probability analysis contains inherent uncertainties as discussed in paragraph 7.6.4 of this AC, these uncertainties justify the controlled escalation (in other words, minor adjustments of the task intervals) or exceptional short-term extensions to individual CMRs.

Note: Some latent failures can only be verified by return-to-service tests on the equipment following its removal and repair. The mean time between failures of the equipment can be used to establish the time interval to detect the presence of latent failures if it can be ascertained that the equipment is removed and inspected at a rate more frequent than the safety analysis requires. This credit should be substantiated in the SSA. The means of detecting the latent failures should be clearly documented. For example, these means can be the acceptance tests performed before the equipment leaves the shop, or the system integrity and functional tests when the equipment is installed on the airplane.

8.3.2 Flight with Equipment or Functions Known to be Inoperative. An applicant may elect to develop a list of equipment and functions that can be inoperative for flight, based on stated compensating precautions that should be taken (for example, operational or time limitations, flightcrew procedures, or ground crew checks). The documents used to show compliance with § 25.1309, together with any other relevant information, should be considered when developing this list. Also, experienced engineering and operational judgment should be applied when developing this list. If more than one flight is made with equipment known to be inoperative and that equipment affects the probabilities associated with hazardous and/or catastrophic failure conditions, then time limits might be needed for the number of flights or allowed operation time in that airplane configuration. The applicant should propose these time limits to the FAA Flight Standards Service for approval.

AC 25.1309-1B · 8-2Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

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