FAA source text, reformatted for reading. Page boundaries and paragraph numbers are retained.
APPENDIX C. OVERVIEW OF THE SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROCESS
C.1 Purpose. In showing compliance with § 25.1309(b), the applicant should address the considerations covered in this AC in a methodical and systematic manner, which ensures that the process and its findings are visible and readily assimilated into compliance-showing documents. The FAA has provided this appendix primarily for applicants who are unfamiliar with the various methods and procedures typically used in the industry to conduct safety assessments. This guide and figures C-1 and C-2 are not certification checklists, and they do not include all the information provided in this AC. There is no necessity for an applicant to use them or for the FAA to accept them, in whole or in part, to show compliance with any regulation. The sole purpose of this guidance is to assist applicants by illustrating a systematic approach to safety assessments, to enhance understanding and communication by summarizing some of the information provided in this AC, and to provide some suggestions on documentation. You can find more detailed guidance in SAE ARP 4761. SAE ARP 4754 includes additional guidance on how the safety assessment process relates to the system development process.
C.2 Safety Assessment Process.
C.2.1 Define the system and its interfaces and identify the functions that the system is to perform. The safety assessment process may identify additional safety requirements for the functions during the system development life cycle.
C.2.2 Determine whether the system is complex, similar to systems used on other airplanes, or conventional. Where multiple systems and functions should be evaluated, consider the relationships between multiple safety assessments.
C.2.3 Identify and classify failure conditions. All relevant applicant engineering organizations, such as systems, structures, propulsion, and flight test, should be involved in this process. This identification and classification may be done by conducting an FHA, which is usually based on one of the following methods, as appropriate:
C.2.3.1 If the system is not complex and its relevant attributes are similar to those of systems used on other airplanes, the identification and classification may be derived from design and installation appraisals and the service experience of the comparable, previously approved systems.
C.2.3.2 If the system is complex, it is necessary to postulate systematically the effects on the safety of the airplane and its occupants resulting from any possible failures, considered both individually and in combination with other failures or events.
