FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

Start with the scope.

Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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Printed page C-2

PDF page 58 of 75

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C.2.3.3 In order to identify the failures that could result in intermittent behaviors, erroneous behaviors, or otherwise unintended behavior, testing should be used where necessary to aid the analytical process.

C.2.4 Choose the means to be used to determine compliance with § 25.1309. The depth and scope of the analysis depends on the types of functions performed by the system, the severity of system failure conditions, and whether or not the system is simple and conventional (see figure C-1). For major failure conditions, experienced engineering and operational judgment, design and installation appraisals, and comparative service experience data on similar systems may be acceptable, either on their own or in conjunction with qualitative analyses or selectively used quantitative analyses. For hazardous or catastrophic failure conditions, the safety assessment should be very thorough. The applicant should obtain early concurrence from the FAA on the choice of an acceptable means of compliance.

AC 25.1309-1B · C-2Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

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75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

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