FAA source text, reformatted for reading. Page boundaries and paragraph numbers are retained.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
2.1 General.
2.1.1 The FAA is issuing this revision 1B concurrently with a number of rule changes that address system safety, such as §§ 25.302, 25.629, 25.671, 25.901, 25.933, 25.1309, and others. The agency developed these rule changes, and corresponding advisory material, based on recommendations from several working groups under the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC).
2.1.2 In 2010, the ARAC Airplane-Level Safety Analysis Working Group (ASAWG) provided recommendations for changes to §§ 25.1301 and 25.1309. The ASAWG also recommended changes to the corresponding advisory material, and the FAA used these recommendations to develop this AC.
2.1.3 In the early years of aviation, airplane systems were evaluated to specific requirements: to the “single fault” criterion or to the fail-safe design concept, which are explained below. As later-generation airplanes developed, their designers added more safety-critical functions, which generally resulted in an increase in the complexity of the systems designed to perform these functions. A safety-critical function was a function whose failure when required would result in a catastrophic condition. The potential hazards to the airplane and its occupants, in the event of failure of one or more functions provided by a system, had to be considered, as did the interaction between systems performing different functions. To assess the safety of a complex system—and the adequacy of system redundancy to meet the fail-safe criterion—the FAA began assigning statistical probabilities to system failures in AC 25.1309-1, dated September 7, 1982. The agency’s primary objective was to ensure that the proliferation of safety-critical systems would not increase the probability of a catastrophic accident. The FAA assigned numerical values to the qualitative probabilistic terms in the requirements, for use in those cases where the impact of system failures is examined by quantitative methods of analysis. However, numerical values were intended to supplement, not replace, qualitative methods based on engineering and operational judgment. See appendix A for a historical perspective of the use of statistical probabilities in system safety assessment.
2.2 Fail-Safe Design Concept. The part 25 airworthiness standards for installations of systems and equipment are based on, and incorporate, the objectives, principles, and techniques of the fail-safe design concept, which instructs the applicant to assume that single failures will happen, and to consider the effects of those failures and combinations of failures in defining an acceptable safe design.
