FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND

2.1 General.

2.1.1 The FAA is issuing this revision 1B concurrently with a number of rule changes that address system safety, such as §§ 25.302, 25.629, 25.671, 25.901, 25.933, 25.1309, and others. The agency developed these rule changes, and corresponding advisory material, based on recommendations from several working groups under the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC).

2.1.2 In 2010, the ARAC Airplane-Level Safety Analysis Working Group (ASAWG) provided recommendations for changes to §§ 25.1301 and 25.1309. The ASAWG also recommended changes to the corresponding advisory material, and the FAA used these recommendations to develop this AC.

2.1.3 In the early years of aviation, airplane systems were evaluated to specific requirements: to the “single fault” criterion or to the fail-safe design concept, which are explained below. As later-generation airplanes developed, their designers added more safety-critical functions, which generally resulted in an increase in the complexity of the systems designed to perform these functions. A safety-critical function was a function whose failure when required would result in a catastrophic condition. The potential hazards to the airplane and its occupants, in the event of failure of one or more functions provided by a system, had to be considered, as did the interaction between systems performing different functions. To assess the safety of a complex system—and the adequacy of system redundancy to meet the fail-safe criterion—the FAA began assigning statistical probabilities to system failures in AC 25.1309-1, dated September 7, 1982. The agency’s primary objective was to ensure that the proliferation of safety-critical systems would not increase the probability of a catastrophic accident. The FAA assigned numerical values to the qualitative probabilistic terms in the requirements, for use in those cases where the impact of system failures is examined by quantitative methods of analysis. However, numerical values were intended to supplement, not replace, qualitative methods based on engineering and operational judgment. See appendix A for a historical perspective of the use of statistical probabilities in system safety assessment.

2.2 Fail-Safe Design Concept. The part 25 airworthiness standards for installations of systems and equipment are based on, and incorporate, the objectives, principles, and techniques of the fail-safe design concept, which instructs the applicant to assume that single failures will happen, and to consider the effects of those failures and combinations of failures in defining an acceptable safe design.

AC 25.1309-1B · 2-1Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

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