FAA source text, reformatted for reading. Page boundaries and paragraph numbers are retained.
2.2.1 In fail-safe design, the following basic objectives pertaining to failures apply:
2.2.1.1 In any system or subsystem, the failure of any single element, component, or connection during any one flight must be assumed, regardless of its probability. Such single failures must not be catastrophic. See definition of “catastrophic” in paragraph 3.1.5 of this AC.
2.2.1.2 Subsequent failures during the same flight, whether detected or latent, and combinations thereof, should also be considered.
2.2.2 The fail-safe design concept uses the following design principles or techniques in order to ensure an acceptable safe design. The use of only one of these principles or techniques is seldom adequate. A combination of two or more is usually needed to provide a fail-safe design, in other words, to ensure that major failure conditions are remote, hazardous failure conditions are extremely remote, and catastrophic failure conditions are extremely improbable.
2.2.2.1 Designed Integrity and Quality, including Life Limits, to ensure intended
function and prevent failures.
2.2.2.2 Redundancy or Backup Systems to enable continued function after any
single (or other defined number of) failure(s), for example, two or more engines, hydraulic systems, and so forth.
2.2.2.3 Isolation and/or Segregation of Systems, Components, and Elements so
that the failure of one does not cause the failure of another.
2.2.2.4 Proven Reliability so that multiple, independent failures are unlikely to
occur during the same flight.
2.2.2.5 Failure Annunciation or Indication to provide awareness in case of
detected failures.
2.2.2.6 Flightcrew Procedures specifying corrective action for use after failure
detection.
2.2.2.7 Checkability, which is the capability to check a component’s condition.
2.2.2.8 Designed Failure Effect Limits, including the capability to sustain damage
to limit the safety impact or effects of a failure.
2.2.2.9 Designed Failure Path to control and direct the effects of a failure in a way
that limits its safety impact.
2.2.2.10 Margins or Factors of Safety to allow for any undefined or unforeseeable
adverse conditions.
