FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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Printed page 2-2

PDF page 18 of 75

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2.2.1 In fail-safe design, the following basic objectives pertaining to failures apply:

2.2.1.1 In any system or subsystem, the failure of any single element, component, or connection during any one flight must be assumed, regardless of its probability. Such single failures must not be catastrophic. See definition of “catastrophic” in paragraph 3.1.5 of this AC.

2.2.1.2 Subsequent failures during the same flight, whether detected or latent, and combinations thereof, should also be considered.

2.2.2 The fail-safe design concept uses the following design principles or techniques in order to ensure an acceptable safe design. The use of only one of these principles or techniques is seldom adequate. A combination of two or more is usually needed to provide a fail-safe design, in other words, to ensure that major failure conditions are remote, hazardous failure conditions are extremely remote, and catastrophic failure conditions are extremely improbable.

2.2.2.1 Designed Integrity and Quality, including Life Limits, to ensure intended

function and prevent failures.

2.2.2.2 Redundancy or Backup Systems to enable continued function after any

single (or other defined number of) failure(s), for example, two or more engines, hydraulic systems, and so forth.

2.2.2.3 Isolation and/or Segregation of Systems, Components, and Elements so

that the failure of one does not cause the failure of another.

2.2.2.4 Proven Reliability so that multiple, independent failures are unlikely to

occur during the same flight.

2.2.2.5 Failure Annunciation or Indication to provide awareness in case of

detected failures.

2.2.2.6 Flightcrew Procedures specifying corrective action for use after failure

detection.

2.2.2.7 Checkability, which is the capability to check a component’s condition.

2.2.2.8 Designed Failure Effect Limits, including the capability to sustain damage

to limit the safety impact or effects of a failure.

2.2.2.9 Designed Failure Path to control and direct the effects of a failure in a way

that limits its safety impact.

2.2.2.10 Margins or Factors of Safety to allow for any undefined or unforeseeable

adverse conditions.

AC 25.1309-1B · 2-2Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

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