FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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manufacturing that could result in common mode failures should be assessed. Appendix B of this AC and SAE ARP 4761 describe types of analysis methods that may be conducted to identify and minimize common mode failures and document that adequate independence exists between multiple failures. Failure containment techniques available to establish independence may include partitioning, separation, and isolation. It should be noted that only the dominant modes of failure are typically identified and evaluated in a bottom-up component FMEA. For example, the dominant mode “loss of command signal” may be caused by one or more failures of components that produce, process, or transmit the command signal. However, identifying only the dominant failure modes may not be sufficient. To show that no failure mode is anticipated to cause a catastrophic event, consideration of less-obvious failure modes may be required. The information available from top-down analyses, such as the fault tree analysis, can help focus the single failure analysis onto areas of the design where an obscure failure mode might be able to violate an otherwise fail-safe design. (One example of an obscure failure mode is intermittent shorting in the monitored signal’s path that allows it to defeat the monitor coverage.)

7.3.2 While single failures must normally be assumed to occur, there are cases where it is obvious that, from a realistic and practical viewpoint, any knowledgeable, experienced person would unequivocally conclude that a failure mode simply would not occur, unless it is associated with a wholly unrelated failure condition that would itself be catastrophic. These types of failures may be considered as not foreseeable. Once identified and accepted, such cases need not be considered failures in the context of § 25.1309. Probabilistic methods may not be used in making this assessment.

7.4 Common Cause Failure Considerations. An analysis should consider the application of the fail-safe design concept described in paragraph 2.2 of this AC. The analysis should also give special attention to ensuring the effective use of design and installation techniques that would prevent single failures or other events from damaging or otherwise adversely affecting more than one redundant system channel, more than one system performing operationally similar functions, or any system and an associated safeguard.

When considering such common cause failures or other events, consequential or cascading effects should be taken into account. Cascading effects are the set of effects resulting from the propagation of an initiating condition (e.g., a failure or initiating event).

Some examples of potential sources of common cause failures or other events would include the following:

• Rapid release of energy from concentrated sources, such as uncontained failures of rotating parts (other than engines and propellers) or pressure vessels,

• Pressure differentials,

• Non-catastrophic structural failures,

• Loss of environmental conditioning,

AC 25.1309-1B · 7-2Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

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75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

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