FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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Printed page 6-3

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With increasing integrated system architectures, this traditional top-down approach should be performed in conjunction with common-cause considerations (e.g., common resources) in order to adequately address the cases where one system contributes to multiple airplane-level functions.

6.3 Considerations when Assessing Failure Condition Effects.

6.3.1 The requirements of § 25.1309(b) are intended to ensure an orderly and thorough evaluation of the effects on safety of foreseeable failures or other external events, separately or in combination, involving one or more system functions. The interactions of these factors within a system and among relevant systems should be considered. In assessing the effects of a failure condition, factors that might alleviate or intensify the direct effects of the initial failure condition should be considered. Some of these factors include consequent or related conditions existing within the airplane that might affect the flightcrew’s ability to deal with direct effects, such as the presence of smoke, acceleration effects, interruption of communication, interference with cabin pressurization, and so forth. When assessing the consequences of a given failure condition, the applicant should consider the failure information provided, the complexity of the flightcrew action, and the relevant crew training. The number of overall failure conditions may influence the expected flightcrew performance. Training recommendations may need to be identified in some cases.

6.3.2 The applicant should evaluate the severity of failure conditions according to the following:

6.3.2.1 Effects on the airplane, such as reductions in safety margins, degradation in performance, loss of capability to conduct certain flight operations, reduction in environmental protection, or potential or consequential effects on structural integrity. When the effects of a failure condition are complex, the hazard classification may need to be validated by tests, simulation, or other appropriate analytical techniques.

6.3.2.2 Effects on the flightcrew, such as increases above their normal workload that would affect their ability to cope with adverse operational or environmental conditions or subsequent failures. Consider any other human factors assumptions made about the flightcrew’s ability to detect, diagnose, and respond appropriately to the failure.

6.3.2.3 Effects on the occupants (passengers and cabin crew).

6.3.2.4 Risks to persons other than airplane occupants (such as ground crew or maintenance personnel) should be taken into account when assessing systems failure conditions in compliance with § 25.1309. See also the discussion in paragraph 1.2.2.13 of this AC.

AC 25.1309-1B · 6-3Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

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