FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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CHAPTER 3. FAILURE CONDITION CLASSIFICATIONS AND PROBABILITY TERMS

3.1 Classifications. The FAA classifies failure conditions according to the severity of their effects as defined in paragraphs 3.1.1 through 3.1.5 below.

Note: The description of the terms provided for major, hazardous, and catastrophic failure conditions are the same as those found in § 25.4.

3.1.1 No Safety Effect. Failure conditions that would have no effect on safety. For example, failure conditions that would not affect the operational capability of the airplane or increase flightcrew workload but may cause inconvenience to passengers or cabin crew.

3.1.2 Minor. A failure condition that would not significantly reduce airplane safety and would only involve flightcrew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions may result in, for example—

• A slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities,

• A slight increase in flightcrew workload, such as routine flight plan changes,

• Some physical discomfort to passengers or cabin crew, or

• An effect of similar severity.

3.1.3 Major. A failure condition that would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the flightcrew to cope with adverse operating conditions, to the extent that there would be:

• A significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities,

• A physical discomfort or significant increase in flightcrew workload or in conditions impairing the efficiency of the flightcrew,

• Physical distress to passengers or cabin crew, possibly including injuries, or

• An effect of similar severity.

3.1.4 Hazardous. A failure condition that would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the flightcrew to cope with adverse operating conditions, to the extent that there would be:

• A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities,

• Physical distress or excessive workload such that the flightcrew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely, or

• Serious or fatal injuries to a relatively small number of persons other than the flightcrew.

AC 25.1309-1B · 3-1Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

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