FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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Printed page 5-6

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5.3.6 Failure Conditions involving Significant Latent Failures.

5.3.6.1 Eliminating all significant latent failures may be impractical in some designs, as it is not always possible to detect any and all failures that may occur during flight. Paragraphs (b)(4) and (b)(5) of § 25.1309 are intended to ensure the minimization of SLFs where it is not possible to completely eliminate them.

5.3.6.2 The elimination and minimization requirement of § 25.1309(b)(4) does not

apply to SLFs where the system failure condition meets the safety objectives of § 25.1309(b)(1) or (b)(2) with the assumption that the latent failure has occurred.

5.3.6.3 Where § 25.1309(b)(4) does apply, a hierarchy of safety objectives for

managing exposure to SLFs needs to be shown.

1. To meet § 25.1309(b)(4), limiting exposure to SLFs should be an

integral part of the applicants' normal design practice. The applicant must first eliminate SLFs to the maximum practical extent. To do so, the applicant should utilize the current state-of-the-art technology, e.g., by implementing practical and reliable failure monitoring and flight crew indication systems to detect failures that would otherwise be latent.

2. For each significant latent failure that cannot reasonably be eliminated, the applicant must minimize the exposure time by design. To do so, the applicant should utilize current state-of-the-art technology rather than relying on scheduled maintenance tasks at lengthy intervals, i.e., implementing pilot-initiated checks, or self-initiated checks (e.g., first flight of the day check, power-up built-in tests, or other system automated checks).

5.3.6.4 An acceptable means of compliance to minimization is to limit the latency of the SLF by minimizing the time the failure is allowed to be present such that the product of this exposure time and the average failure rate of the SLF does not exceed 1/1000. Another acceptable means of compliance to minimization is to show that the failure would not be latent for more than one flight.

5.3.6.5 There can be situations where it is not practical to meet the 1/1000 criterion. For example, if meeting it would result in performing complex or invasive maintenance tasks on the flight line, thereby increasing the risk of incorrect maintenance and associated cost. In such situations, safety is better served when the latent failure is serviced at a suitable maintenance facility. In cases where the applicant can demonstrate that meeting the 1/1000 criterion is not practical, the applicant must minimize the time the failure is expected to be present.

AC 25.1309-1B · 5-6Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

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