FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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Printed page 5-7

PDF page 33 of 75

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5.3.6.6 In those situations where the significant latent failure is assumed to be

latent for the life of the airplane, the applicant should include a qualitative assessment to determine whether a periodic maintenance task is necessary to avoid undue risk due to the exposure to catastrophic or hazardous failure conditions.

5.3.6.7 For a catastrophic failure condition that involves two failures, either of which could be latent for more than one flight, compliance with § 25.1309(b)(5) is required. These failure conditions are denoted as CSL+1. The applicant must first show that it is impractical to design the system with additional fault tolerance, such as adding failure monitors. The assessment should explain why avoidance is not practical and provide supporting rationale for the acceptability. The rationale should be based on the proposed design being state-of-the-art, experience, sound engineering judgment, or other arguments, which led to the decision not to implement additional fault tolerance (e.g., adding failure monitors to eliminate the significant latent failure or adding redundancy to avoid the CSL+1 condition).

5.3.6.8 Once an applicant has shown that CSL+1 conditions are eliminated to the extent practical, the applicant must then apply the criteria in § 25.1309(b)(5)(ii) and (iii) to limit the residual risk in the presence of a latent failure and limit the probability of occurrence of the latent failure itself. These requirements are applied in addition to the requirement of § 25.1309(b)(1) where catastrophic failure conditions must be shown to be extremely improbable and do not result from a single failure.

5.3.6.9 Compliance with § 25.1309(b)(1), (b)(4), and (b)(5) together achieves a balance between the residual risk and latency exposure. For example, in a simple CSL+1 condition, the residual risk would need to be on the order of 1 x 10-6 per flight hour (or better) when the latency is 1/1000 to satisfy the requirement is extremely improbable (1 x 10-9 per flight hour). Conversely, if the failure rate of the residual component is 1 x 10-5 per flight hour, then latency is limited to a probability of 1 x 10-4. Appendix D of this AC gives a more comprehensive example of how an applicant may conduct limit latency and residual risk analysis to show compliance with § 25.1309(b)(5)(ii) and (iii).

5.3.6.10 Although exposure to latency time is normally expressed in terms of flight hours, if the relevant failures depend on flight cycles, then their exposure times should be evaluated in terms of flight cycles when showing compliance. (See paragraph 7.6.1.4.)

AC 25.1309-1B · 5-7Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

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