FAA source text, reformatted for reading. Page boundaries and paragraph numbers are retained.
5.3.6.6 In those situations where the significant latent failure is assumed to be
latent for the life of the airplane, the applicant should include a qualitative assessment to determine whether a periodic maintenance task is necessary to avoid undue risk due to the exposure to catastrophic or hazardous failure conditions.
5.3.6.7 For a catastrophic failure condition that involves two failures, either of which could be latent for more than one flight, compliance with § 25.1309(b)(5) is required. These failure conditions are denoted as CSL+1. The applicant must first show that it is impractical to design the system with additional fault tolerance, such as adding failure monitors. The assessment should explain why avoidance is not practical and provide supporting rationale for the acceptability. The rationale should be based on the proposed design being state-of-the-art, experience, sound engineering judgment, or other arguments, which led to the decision not to implement additional fault tolerance (e.g., adding failure monitors to eliminate the significant latent failure or adding redundancy to avoid the CSL+1 condition).
5.3.6.8 Once an applicant has shown that CSL+1 conditions are eliminated to the extent practical, the applicant must then apply the criteria in § 25.1309(b)(5)(ii) and (iii) to limit the residual risk in the presence of a latent failure and limit the probability of occurrence of the latent failure itself. These requirements are applied in addition to the requirement of § 25.1309(b)(1) where catastrophic failure conditions must be shown to be extremely improbable and do not result from a single failure.
5.3.6.9 Compliance with § 25.1309(b)(1), (b)(4), and (b)(5) together achieves a balance between the residual risk and latency exposure. For example, in a simple CSL+1 condition, the residual risk would need to be on the order of 1 x 10-6 per flight hour (or better) when the latency is 1/1000 to satisfy the requirement is extremely improbable (1 x 10-9 per flight hour). Conversely, if the failure rate of the residual component is 1 x 10-5 per flight hour, then latency is limited to a probability of 1 x 10-4. Appendix D of this AC gives a more comprehensive example of how an applicant may conduct limit latency and residual risk analysis to show compliance with § 25.1309(b)(5)(ii) and (iii).
5.3.6.10 Although exposure to latency time is normally expressed in terms of flight hours, if the relevant failures depend on flight cycles, then their exposure times should be evaluated in terms of flight cycles when showing compliance. (See paragraph 7.6.1.4.)
