FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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1.2.2.2 Although the applicant does not need to account for § 25.1309 when showing compliance with the performance and flight characteristics requirements of part 25, subpart B, and the structural requirements of part 25, subparts C and D, § 25.1309 does apply to any system on which compliance with any of those requirements is based. For example, § 25.1309 does not apply to an airplane’s inherent stall characteristics or their evaluation, but it does apply to a stall warning system used for compliance with § 25.207.

1.2.2.3 Some systems and functions already receive an evaluation to show compliance with specific requirements for specific failure conditions. Such evaluations may also be used to show compliance with § 25.1309 without additional or duplicative analysis for those specific failure conditions. The applicant provides substantiation that the evaluation is an acceptable means of compliance to § 25.1309 and documents it in the certification plans for approval by the certification office.

1.2.2.4 Jams of flight control surfaces or pilot controls covered by § 25.671(c)(3) are excepted from the requirements of § 25.1309(b).

1.2.2.5 Single failures covered by § 25.735(b)(1) are excepted from the requirements of § 25.1309(b) because § 25.735(b)(1) limits the effect of a single failure in the brake system to doubling the brake roll stopping distance. This requirement provides a satisfactory level of safety without the need to analyze the particular circumstances and conditions under which the single failure occurs. In addition, the diverse circumstances under which such a failure could occur make any structured determination of its outcome or frequency indeterminate. However, § 25.1309(b) does apply to failures in the brake systems that are not related to the intended braked roll stopping distance or if the failures affect functions other than braking. For example, if a hydraulic brake line failure in the brake system also affects ground spoiler deployment, then § 25.1309(b) applies to that failure.

1.2.2.6 The failure effects covered by §§ 25.810(a)(1)(v) and 25.812 are excepted from the requirements of § 25.1309(b). The failure conditions associated with these cabin safety equipment installations are associated with varied evacuation scenarios for which the probability cannot be determined due to the multitude of factors that can lead to an evacuation. For these types of equipment, the FAA has not been able to define appropriate scenarios under which an applicant could demonstrate compliance with § 25.1309(b). Therefore, the FAA considers it acceptable in terms of safety to require particular design features or specific reliability demonstrations for these types of equipment, and to exclude these equipment items from the requirements of § 25.1309(b). Traditionally, the FAA has found this approach acceptable.

AC 25.1309-1B · 1-2Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

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