FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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1.2.2.7 The requirements of § 25.1309 are applicable to powerplant installations. The specific applicability and exceptions are stated in § 25.901(c). Section 25.901(c) states that § 25.1309(b) does not apply to propeller debris release failures; those failures are addressed by § 25.905(d) and 14 CFR part 35. Section 25.1309(b) does not apply to uncontained engine rotor failure, engine case rupture, or engine case burn-through failures addressed by §§ 25.903(d)(1) and 25.1193 and 14 CFR part 33.

1.2.2.8 In accordance with § 25.901(d), the requirements of § 25.901(c) and hence § 25.1309 are applicable to auxiliary power unit installations.

1.2.2.9 The fuel system is part of the powerplant installation and therefore must comply with § 25.1309. In addition, fuel systems must comply with § 25.954, Fuel system lightning protection, and § 25.981, Fuel tank explosion prevention. Section 25.954 provides a standard for lightning protection of both fuel tank structure and fuel tank systems. Refer to AC 25.954-1, Transport Airplane Fuel System Lightning Protection, for guidance on the safety assessment of fuel tank lightning protection. Section 25.981 provides standards for the prevention of ignition sources, other than lightning, within the fuel tanks of transport category airplanes. Refer to AC 25.981-1D, Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention Guidelines, for guidance on the safety assessment of fuel system ignition sources, other than lightning.

1.2.2.10 Section 25.1309, including the no-single-failure requirement, applies to structural elements in systems, even though those structural elements may also be required to meet the fatigue and damage tolerance criteria of § 25.571. For structural elements in systems, (with the exception of the main structural elements in landing gear, the horizontal stabilizer surface, and other control surfaces, including high lift surfaces), meeting the damage tolerance requirement of § 25.571 by itself is not sufficient to justify the assumption that a single failure will not occur. This is because single failure of structural elements can occur due to causes other than those addressed by § 25.571. For specific guidance related to structural elements in flight control systems, refer to Policy Statement No. PS- ANM-25-12 or the most recent FAA policy.

1.2.2.11 Section 25.1309 requirements are applicable to the electrical and

electronic systems covered under § 25.1316, Electrical and electronic system lightning protection, and § 25.1317, High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection. Sections 25.1316 and 25.1317 provide standards for those systems that are considered critical for continued safe flight and landing. Refer to AC 20-136, Aircraft Electrical and Electronic System Lightning Protection, and AC 20-158, The Certification of Aircraft Electrical and Electronic Systems for Operation in the HIRF Environment, for guidance on the safety assessment of electrical and electronic systems for lightning and HIRF environments, respectively.

AC 25.1309-1B · 1-3Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

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