FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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1.5.6 Certification Maintenance Requirement (CMR). A required scheduled maintenance task established during the design certification of the airplane systems as an airworthiness limitation of the type certificate or supplemental type certificate. This term is defined in § 25.4 Definitions.

Note: The CMRs are a subset of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) identified during the certification process.

1.5.7 Complex. A system is complex when its operation, failure modes, or failure effects are difficult to comprehend without the aid of analytical methods.

1.5.8 Conventional. A system is conventional if its functionality, the technological means used to implement its functionality, and its intended usage are all the same as, or closely similar to, that of previously approved systems that are commonly used.

1.5.9 Design Appraisal. A qualitative appraisal of the integrity and safety of the system design.

1.5.10 Development Assurance. All planned and systematic actions used to substantiate, to an adequate level of confidence, that errors in requirements, design, and implementation have been identified and corrected so that the system satisfies the applicable safety objectives.

1.5.11 Equipment. A physical object that can be installed and removed from the aircraft and performs one or more specific functions. Equipment contains one or more items.

1.5.12 Error. An omission or incorrect action by a flightcrew member or maintenance personnel, or a development error (for example, a mistake in requirements, design, or implementation).

1.5.13 Event. An occurrence or condition that affects airplane safety.

1.5.14 External Event. An occurrence that has its origin distinct from the airplane, such as atmospheric conditions (e.g., gusts, temperature variations, icing, and lightning strikes); runway conditions; conditions of communication, navigation, and surveillance services; bird-strike; and cabin and baggage fires (not initiated by features installed on the airplane); etc. The term does not cover sabotage or other similar intentional acts.

1.5.15 Exposure Time. The time between when an item is known to be operating properly and when it will be known to be operating properly again.

AC 25.1309-1B · 1-9Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

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75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

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