FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

Start with the scope.

Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

The source, within reach.

Search within this AC, jump to a source page, or download the complete saved publication.

Download saved FAA PDF ↓

Find your starting point

What are you looking into?

Go directly to a useful part of the document.

Read the source

The document, within reach.

FAA source document

Printed page 1-10

PDF page 15 of 75

FAA source text, reformatted for reading. Page boundaries and paragraph numbers are retained.

1.5.16 Failure. An occurrence that affects the operation of a component, part, or element such that it no longer functions as intended. This includes both loss of function and malfunction.

Note: Errors may cause failures or influence their effects but are not considered to be failures.

1.5.17 Failure Condition. A condition, caused or contributed to by one or more failures or errors, that has either a direct or consequential effect on the airplane, its occupants, or other persons, accounting for—

• Flight phase,

• Relevant adverse operational or environmental conditions, and

• External events.

1.5.18 Failure Mode. A specific way in which a system, equipment, hardware item, or piece-part may fail.

1.5.19 Ground Crew. For the purposes of a system safety assessment, ground crew includes aircraft handling, maintenance or servicing personnel operating in or within the vicinity of the aircraft while it is in a ground operating condition.

1.5.20 Installation Appraisal. This is a qualitative appraisal of the integrity and safety of the installation including the evaluation of any deviations from normal, industry-accepted installation practices, such as clearances or tolerances, especially in the case of modifications made after entry into service.

1.5.21 Latent Failure. A failure that is not detected or annunciated when it occurs.

1.5.22 Qualitative analytical process. Those analytical processes that assess system and airplane safety in a non-numerical manner. Engineering judgment or an acceptable rough-order estimate may be used in this process.

1.5.23 Quantitative analytical process. Those analytical processes that apply numerical methods and statistical analyses to assess system and airplane safety.

1.5.24 Redundancy. The presence of more than one independent means for accomplishing a given function or flight operation.

AC 25.1309-1B · 1-10Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

Original FAA PDF ↗

Working through a certification question?

Bring the aircraft, the basis and the issue your team needs to resolve.

Discuss your programme →