FAA source text, reformatted for reading. Page boundaries and paragraph numbers are retained.
7.5.3 Major Failure Conditions. Major failure conditions must be remote, per § 25.1309(b)(3).
7.5.3.1 If the system is similar in its relevant attributes to those used in other airplanes and the effects of failure would be the same, then design and installation appraisals (as described in Appendix B of this AC) and satisfactory service history of the equipment being analyzed, or of similar design, is usually acceptable for showing compliance. The applicant should substantiate similarity claims by identifying the differences between the system/equipment being certified and other system/equipment to which similarity is claimed. The applicant should also provide the rationale for why the service history of the other system/equipment is applicable.
7.5.3.2 For systems that are not complex, where similarity cannot be used as the basis for compliance, then compliance may be shown with a qualitative assessment showing that the system-level major failure conditions of the system, as installed, are consistent with the FHA and are remote (for example, redundant systems).
7.5.3.3 For complex systems without redundancy, compliance may be shown as in paragraph 7.5.3.2 above. To show that malfunctions are remote in systems of high complexity without redundancy (for example, a system with a self-monitoring microprocessor), it is sometimes necessary to conduct a qualitative functional FMEA supported by failure rate data and fault detection coverage analysis.
7.5.3.4 An analysis of a redundant system is usually complete if it shows isolation between redundant system channels and satisfactory reliability for each channel. For complex systems where functional redundancy is required, a qualitative FMEA and qualitative fault tree analysis may be necessary to determine whether redundancy actually exists (for example, no single failure affects all functional channels).
7.5.4 Hazardous and Catastrophic Failure Conditions. Hazardous failure conditions must be extremely remote, per § 25.1309(b)(2), and catastrophic failure conditions must be extremely improbable, per § 25.1309(b)(1).
7.5.4.1 Except as specified in paragraph 7.5.4.2 below, a detailed safety analysis is necessary for each hazardous and catastrophic failure condition identified by the FHA. The analysis is usually a combination of qualitative and quantitative assessment of the design.
7.5.4.2 For very simple and conventional installations—that is, low complexity and similarity in relevant attributes—it may be possible to assess a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition as extremely remote or
