FAA source text, reformatted for reading. Page boundaries and paragraph numbers are retained.
functional categories as non-essential, essential, and critical. However, for all practical purposes, the non-essential category was synonymous with the minor category in the BCAR; the essential category spanned the BCAR major and hazardous categories; and critical was the same as catastrophic in the BCAR. The qualitative and quantitative probabilities that were defined in AC 25.1309-1, and the described application of those probabilities, were, for the most part, the same as the BCAR.
A.4 FAA AC 25.1309-1A. In the 1980s, the FAA and the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) of Europe harmonized SSA requirements in § 25.1309 and Joint Airworthiness Requirement 25.1309, and the guidance in AC 25.1309-1A and its counterpart JAA Advisory Material Joint (AMJ) 25.1309. The only substantive difference between the AC and AMJ was that the JAA retained the “hazardous” category and its associated probability definitions from the BCAR; whereas the FAA did not but implied an intermediate “severe major” hazard category similar to “hazardous.” Otherwise, the definitions and probability values in the AC and AMJ were the same as those in the BCAR and Concorde standard. Both the AC and AMJ also contained a continuing strong emphasis on fail-safe design as the basic intent of the requirements.
A.5 This AC. In revising § 25.1309 at amendment 25-152 (89 FR 68706, August 27, 2024), the FAA added the “hazardous” category. In this AC, the FAA addresses five failure condition classifications (no safety effect, minor, major, hazardous, and catastrophic) and their associated qualitative and quantitative probabilities. These terms are harmonized with European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) 25.1309.
A.6 Quantitative Probability Terms. The quantitative probability values contained in this AC should not be applied independently of the qualitative guidance. For example, meeting the 1 x 10-9 per flight hour quantitative probability guidance alone is not sufficient to show compliance with the intent of the “extremely improbable” requirement of § 25.1309(b) if relevant experience indicates the failure condition can occur. The FAA’s guidance for using quantitative probability values to meet airworthiness standards has been unchanged since the 1970s. The probability numbers contained in this AC are provided solely for use in evaluating “statistically controllable” hazard contributors within the context of the analysis methodology described. The quantitative values in this AC do not represent FAA accident-rate goals or expectations. The values are unchanged from those derived for the Concorde program because it has been shown in service that the actual system safety achieved using fail-safe design techniques and the combination of qualitative and quantitative guidance in this AC continues to be acceptable.
