FAA source text, reformatted for reading. Page boundaries and paragraph numbers are retained.
B.1.5 Markov Analysis. A Markov model represents various system states and the relationships among them. The states can be either operational or non-operational. The transitions from one state to another are a function of the failure and repair rates. Markov analysis can be used as a replacement for fault tree or dependence diagram analysis, but it often leads to more complex representation, especially when the system has many states. The FAA recommends using Markov analysis when fault tree or dependence diagrams are not easily usable, namely to account for complex transition states of systems that are difficult to represent and handle with classic fault tree or dependence diagram analysis.
B.1.6 Zonal Safety, Particular Risk, and Common Mode Analyses. The acceptance of adequate probability of failure conditions is often derived from the assessment of multiple systems based on the assumption that failures are independent. Therefore, it is necessary to recognize that such independence may not exist in the practical sense, and specific studies are necessary to ensure that independence can either be assured or deemed acceptable. These analyses might also identify failure modes and effects that otherwise would not be foreseen. The evaluation of independence is sub-divided into three areas of study:
B.1.6.1 Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA). The objective of zonal safety analysis is to ensure that equipment installations within each zone of the airplane meet an adequate safety standard with respect to design and installation standards, interference between systems, and maintenance errors. The analysis also needs to consider the risk that various installers may make with decisions regarding routing, supporting a harness, clearances, etc. In those areas of the airplane where multiple systems and components are installed in close proximity, it should be ensured that the zonal safety analysis identifies any failure or malfunction, which by itself is considered sustainable, but could have more severe effects by adversely affecting other adjacent systems or components.
B.1.6.2 Particular Risk Analysis (PRA). Particular risks are defined as those events or influences that are outside the systems concerned. Examples are fire, leaking fluids, bird strike, tire burst, high intensity radiated fields exposure, lightning, uncontained failure of high energy rotating machines, etc. Each risk should be studied to examine and document the simultaneous or cascading effects or influences that may violate independence.
