FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

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F.3 Calculating the Probability of a Failure Condition for a Certain Average Flight. The probability of a failure condition occurring on an average flight Pflight(failure condition in a flight) should be determined by structured methods (see SAE ARP 4761 for example methods) and should consider all significant elements (e.g., combinations of failures and events) that contribute to the failure condition. The following should be considered:

F.3.1 The component failure rates used to calculate the “average probability per flight hour” should be estimates of the mature constant failure rates after infant mortality and prior to wear out. For components whose probability of failure may be associated with non-constant failure rates within the operational life of the airplane, reliability analysis may be used to determine component replacement times. In either case, the failure rate should be based on all causes of failure (operational, environmental, and so forth). The failure rate is for the type design hardware that is operated and maintained through servicing plans or ICA requirements. Where available, service history of same or similar components in the same or similar environment should be used.

F.3.1.1 Aging and wear of similarly constructed and similarly loaded redundant components that could directly, or when in combination with one other failure, lead to a catastrophic or hazardous failure condition should be assessed when determining scheduled maintenance tasks for such components.

F.3.1.2 Replacement times—necessary to mitigate the risk due to aging and wear of those components whose failures could directly, or in combination with one other failure, lead to a catastrophic or hazardous failure condition within the operational life of the airplane—should be assessed through the same methodology as other scheduled maintenance tasks required to satisfy § 25.1309 (for example, AC 25-19A) and documented in the ALS as appropriate.

F.3.2 If one failed element in the system can persist for multiple flights (latent, dormant, or hidden failures), the calculation should consider the relevant exposure times (for example, time intervals between maintenance and operational checks/inspections). In such cases, the total probability of the failure condition increases with the number of flights during the latency period.

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

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75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

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