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AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

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Original FAA AC 25.1309-1B, PDF page 73
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F.4 Calculation of the “Probability per Flight” of a Failure Condition over a period of N flights. The next step is to calculate the probability per flight for the failure condition. In other words, the probability of the failure condition for each flight (which might be different although all flights are average flights) during the relevant time (for example, the least common multiple of the exposure times or the airplane life) should be calculated, summed up, and divided by the number of flights during that period. The principles of calculating are described below and in more detail in SAE ARP 4761.

F.4.1.1 The element is checked operative at the beginning of the certain flight, Then:

∑𝑁𝑁 𝑘𝑘=1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘) 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡) = 𝑁𝑁

F.4.1.2 The state of the single element is unknown at the beginning of the certain flight.

Then: ∑𝑁𝑁 𝑘𝑘=1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘) 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡) + 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡)

𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡) + ቀ1 −𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡)ቁ∗ቌ1 −ෑ𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ቆ−න 𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒ቇቍ 𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓=1 𝑖𝑖−1

Thus: 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡) =

𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡) + ቀ1 −𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡)ቁ∗൬1 −∏𝑛𝑛 𝑓𝑓=1 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ቀ− 𝑡𝑡 ∫𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒)𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒ቁ൰ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 𝑁𝑁

Where N is the quantity of all flights during the relevant time, and Pflight k is the probability that the failure condition occurs in flight k.

F.5 Calculation of the “Average Probability per Flight Hour” of a Failure Condition. Once the average probability per flight has been calculated, it should be normalized by dividing it by the average flight duration TF in flight hours to obtain the average probability per flight hour. This quantitative value should be used in conjunction with the hazard category/effect established by the FHA to determine if it is compliant for the failure condition being analyzed.

𝑃𝑃 (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡) 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒) = 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

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75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

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