This extraction supports search. Read the original page for complete notation and layout.
TABLE D-1. EXAMPLE OF CSL+1 IDENTIFICATION FOR § 25.1309(B)(5) COMPLIANCE
Section 25.1309(b)(5)(ii) and
Exposure
MCS No.
Combined Probability
Basic Event CSL+1? Failure
Rate
time Event Probability
(iii) Applicability and Compliance
1 1.0 x 10-9 A001
1 x 10-7 2.5 h 2.5 x 10-7 Not compliant with limit
L001 4 x 10-6 1000 h 4 x 10-3
Yes
latency criterion since L001 probability is more frequent than 1 x 10-3.
2 5.000x 10-10 A002
L003 1 x 106 10 h 1 x 10-5
Yes
2 x 10-5 2.5 h 5 x 10-5 Not compliant with residual risk criterion since A002 probability is more frequent than 1 x 10-5/FH
3 2.500 x 10-
A004
1 x 10-5 2.5 h 2.5x 10-5 Note: MCS no. #2 and #3 are
10
L003 1 x 10-6 10 h 1 x 10-5
Yes
grouped due to common L003. Although A004 probability is equal to 1 x 10-5/FH, the residual risk criterion is not met because the combined probability of A004 and A002 (2.5 x 10-5 + 5 x 10-5)/FH is more frequent than 1 x 10-5/FH.
4 2.500 x 10-
A004
1 x 10-5 2.5 h 2.5 x 10-5 Compliant with both limit
10
L005 1 x 106 10 h 1 x 10-5
Yes
latency and residual risk criteria. Note: MCS no. #3 and #4 are grouped due to common A004. Combined L003 and L005 ((1 x 10-5 + 1 x 10-5) is less than 1 x 10-3
5 1.250 x 10-
A002
10
A005 1 x 10-6 2.5 h 2.5 x 10-6
No
2 x 10-5 2.5 h 5 x 10-5 Section 25.1309(b)(5) does not apply since this dual failure combination does not contain any latent failure.
6.5 x 10-
6 1.625 x 10-
A003
2.5 h 1.625 x 10-6 Compliant with both limit
12
7
L004 1 x 10-7 10.0 h 1 x 10-6
Yes
latency and residual risk criteria. A003 = 1.625x10-6/FH is less than 1.0x10-5/FH L004=1x10-6 less than 1x10-3
7 1.000 x 10-
A002
10
No
2 x 10-5 2.5 h 5 x 10-5 Section 25.1309(b)(5) does not apply since this is a triple- failure combination. L001 4 x 10-6 1000 h 4 x 10-3
L002 5 x 10-6 100 h 5 x 10-4
MCS: Minimal Cut Set: the smallest set of events whose occurrence is sufficient to cause the Top event or failure condition. A: Active failure; L: Latent failure Flight time = 2.5 hour of flight P[LAT i] ~ FR * T
Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.
Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective
Connect the analysis to the design.
A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.
01 / Define the failure conditions
Begin with functions and effects.
Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.
Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.
Connect the analysis to the implemented configuration, justified data, verification results, crew actions and maintenance requirements. Keep unresolved assumptions visible until they are closed.
Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.
75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.
A focused review, an agreed assessment package or ongoing support alongside your team. We can agree the relevant inputs and scope in the initial conversation.
This opens your email application.
Start a conversation
Tell us about your programme, the system you are developing and the support you need.
We can agree a focused use-case review, a defined evidence package or ongoing programme support.
This opens your email application.
Specialist aerospace expertise
Aerospace Consulting is led by Hussein Khimji, an FAA Designated Engineering Representative in systems and equipment, with a focus on system safety, flight controls and avionics.
We work with aircraft developers and systems suppliers to connect technical decisions, safety assessments and certification evidence.
This is the proposed introduction. The full About page will add your approved biography and associate expertise.
Systems engineering & development assurance
Tell us about the aircraft or system, its intended function, stage of development and the support you need.