FAA / Advisory circular

AC 25.1309-1B

System Design and Analysis

System design, failure conditions, analysis and the evidence supporting a system safety assessment.

Start with the scope.

Guidance for showing compliance with §25.1309. Confirm the applicable amendment level and accepted means for the programme.

The source, within reach.

Search within this AC, jump to a source page, or download the complete saved publication.

Download saved FAA PDF ↓

Find your starting point

What are you looking into?

Go directly to a useful part of the document.

Read the source

The document, within reach.

FAA source document

Printed page C-5

PDF page 61 of 75

FAA source text, reformatted for reading. Page boundaries and paragraph numbers are retained.

C.2.8.2 System Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA). A systematic, comprehensive evaluation of system functions to identify and classify failure conditions of those functions according to their severity. Because there are many systems on an airplane, the figure depicts multiple system FHAs.

C.2.8.3 Analyses. Analyses of the preliminary or proposed system designs. These analyses include Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA), Particular Risk Analysis (PRA), Cascading Effects Analysis (CEA) and Common Mode Analysis (CMA).

C.2.8.4 System Safety Assessments (SSAs). A systematic, comprehensive evaluation of the design implementation to verify it meets all applicable requirements. There are multiple SSAs, and typically one SSA for each system. The SSA may be preceded by a Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA), which is used to evaluate the preliminary design and validate its safety requirements.

C.2.8.5 Aircraft Safety Assessment (ASA). The Aircraft Safety Assessment (ASA) is a systematic, integrated evaluation of the SSAs taken together, to verify that the airplane as a whole meets all applicable requirements. This assessment corresponds to the requirement in § 25.1309(b) that specifies systems be evaluated in relation to other systems.

C.2.9 The applicant documents the results, together with any maintenance requirements (e.g., CMRs) and required flight crew procedures (e.g., flightcrew actions in response to flight deck alerts).

AC 25.1309-1B · C-5Open saved PDF here ↗

Saved from the FAA on November 16, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

Aerospace Consulting / Engineering perspective

Connect the analysis
to the design.

A useful assessment explains why the architecture meets the safety objectives, what assumptions it relies on, and how those assumptions will be verified. We use the guidance to structure the questions and evidence around the actual system.

01 / Define the failure conditions

Begin with functions and effects.

Describe the operating context, affected functions, crew response and interactions with other systems. Carry the resulting safety objectives into the architecture and requirements.

FHA guidance · §6.2 →
02 / Examine the architecture

Make independence and exposure explicit.

Explain monitoring, fault containment and common causes. Examine significant latent failures and the assumptions about how long a failure can remain present.

Latent failures · §5.3.6 →Common cause · §7.4 →
Methods and editions need to be agreed.

Our practice uses ARP4761A and ARP4754B to organise safety assessment and systems development work. This AC refers to ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 without revision letters. Its references alone do not establish acceptance of a particular revision for a programme.

Source edition and reading coverage

75 original pages. 55 pages have reviewed text reflows. Original-first pages retain the source layout, with extracted text available for finding words.

Source SHA-256: 90e625593d472b74ec69fbcefe97649f97794410dbe844f7684b397121ac5a92

This is a dated source copy. Automatic source acquisition is not yet scheduled.

Original FAA PDF ↗

Working through a certification question?

Bring the aircraft, the basis and the issue your team needs to resolve.

Discuss your programme →