FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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2/27/2014                                      AC 27-1B, Chg 4


      (3) Determine testing that can not be accomplished on the ground and that must
be accomplished in flight.

     j. Flight Test Considerations.

      (1) The level of flight test required to validate a particular HTAWS installation will
be based on the rotorcraft system architecture. Credit may be given for previously
certificated installations, simulations, and ground tests. The requirement for a flight test
needs to be evaluated for each installation.  Initial installations and new sensor inputs
will require flight tests. STC follow-on installations that introduce changes in flight deck
configurations may require flight test. The evaluation of new sensor models or rotorcraft
models may require flight tests, unless it can be shown through a sensitivity analysis
that the new sensor’s dynamic characteristics and the model rotorcraft are compatible
with the current sensor parameters, and will not affect the performance of the HTAWS.

      (2) Flight testing to verify the proper operation of the terrain and obstacle display
should be conducted while verifying all the other required HTAWS functions. Terrain
databases vary significantly in resolution, quality, and treatment of permanent features,
such as forests, which may be significantly different in elevation from the underlying
terrain.  It is necessary to evaluate the operation of HTAWS over a variety of topological
conditions to ensure that protection is provided.

      (3) Specific flight test points should be flown to assess:

            (i) function performance in off-airfield operations,

             (ii) performance of alerting displays and audio in all flight and lighting
conditions,

              (iii) performance of the reduced protection mode flown against obstacles and
terrain, and

          (iv) evaluation of terrain scale, which:

           (A) should be performed during the initial airworthiness certification of the
HTAWS system;

           (B) should not change based on selected mode of operation, and

          (C) should have the capability of being displayed if selected by the pilot.

Note: Operations into off-airfield locations should have a minimum of nuisance alerts.
      Obstacle alerts should provide sufficient time to allow for pilot scan, identification,
       decision making, and action. Additionally, flight test experience has shown that



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Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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