Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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AC 27-1B, Chg 4 2/27/2014
(B) This may be an unannunciated failure of the system to provide the
required alerting functions due to undetected or latent failures.
(iii) Failure of the installed HTAWS must not degrade the integrity of any
essential or critical system installed in the rotorcraft with which the HTAWS interfaces.
(iv) Installed equipment must meet all requirements of TSO-194.
(4) Software and Airborne Electronic Hardware (AEH) Qualification. The software
for the HTAWS should be developed in accordance with RTCA DO-178, Software
Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, or equivalent.
Applicants from the European Union (EU) applying for FAA letter of design approval
(LODA) through European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) may use the European
Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) document EUROCAE ED-12,
Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, in lieu of
RTCA DO-178. AEH should be developed in accordance with RTCA DO-254, Design
Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware. Applicants from the EU
applying for FAA LODA through EASA may use EUROCAE ED-80, Design Assurance
Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware, in lieu of RTCA DO-254. The software and
AEH DAL for HTAWS installed in helicopters should be commensurate with the
following assigned failure condition classifications:
(i) All rotorcraft using HTAWS, whether or not required by regulation, must
conform to the minimum DAL prescribed below to meet operational reliability and
functional requirements. The loss of all HTAWS functions is classified as a failure
condition “minor” by the TSO-C194. Failure of the HTAWS to provide correct terrain
and obstacle aural and visual alerts is classified as a failure condition “major” by the
TSO-C194. The minimum DAL are:
(A) The system software and AEH DAL for failures that lead to the loss of all
HTAWS functions, described in paragraph e. above, must be level D.
(B) The system software and AEH DAL for failures that lead to HMI to the
HTAWS display due to undetected or latent failures must be level C.
(i) This may be a false caution or warning alert due to undetected or latent
failures.
(ii) This may be an unannunciated failure of the system to provide the
required alerting functions due to undetected or latent failures.
(5) Environmental Qualification. Since a TSO is not an installation approval, the
HTAWS installation should be shown to be capable of operating in its expected airborne
environment. One method to show environmental qualification of equipment is set forth
in RTCA DO-160. RTCA DO-160 provides a suite of tests from which tests appropriate
for the expected environment are chosen. For example, the vibration test should be for
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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
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