Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9
Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.
This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.
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2/27/2014 AC 27-1B, Chg 4
g. Certification Requirements. Compliance with RTCA DO-309, along with the
following certification guidance material and clarifications, is an acceptable means, but
not the only means, to secure FAA approval of HTAWS equipment qualification and
installation.
(1) General. For initial approvals, the applicant should provide a detailed systems
description and design features that can be verified by certification engineers and flight
test pilots. Flight-testing should concentrate on the adequacy of the interface, basic
functionality of the system, location and visibility of the display, adequacy of the visual
and aural alerts, day and night lighting, ease of use, understanding of the terrain and
obstacle display, and potential interference with other installed equipment. In general,
each mode of operation of the system should be evaluated in flight. Obstacles are
frequently treated as a single point object, but in reality, obstacles (particularly tall
obstacles) may have significant length and width due to guy wires. Obstacle alerting
functions need to ensure that alerts are provided at sufficient distances and times to
prevent flight into guy wires.
(2) System Safety Assessment. The applicant should perform an FHA and system
safety assessment to establish the HTAWS criticality and hazards associated with the
proposed installation. The reliability level of the system must be commensurate with the
assessed criticality, and compliance with this criticality level must be demonstrated
during certification. These assessments should consider the probability of such failures
as: unannunciated failures, false caution or warning alerts due to undetected (or latent)
failures, failure of the system to provide the required alerting functions due to
undetected (or latent) failures, effects of HTAWS failures on other aircraft systems,
nuisance alerts, etc.
(3) Installations of Required HTAWS. Rotorcraft that operate under regulations
requiring HTAWS must conform to minimum design assurance levels (DAL) to meet
operational reliability and functional requirements. The annunciated loss of all HTAWS
functions is classified as a failure condition “minor.” Failure of the HTAWS to provide
accurate terrain and obstacle aural and visual alerts, on rotorcraft that operate under
rules that require HTAWS, is classified as a failure condition “major” by the TSO-C194.
The HTAWS installation must satisfy the following requirements:
(i) The probability of an annunciated failure that would lead to the loss of all
HTAWS functions that are described in paragraph e. above must be less than or equal
to 10-3 per flight hour.
(ii) The probability of the system to provide HMI to the HTAWS display due to
undetected or latent failures must be less than or equal to 10-5 per flight hour.
(A) This may be a false caution or warning alert due to undetected or latent
failures.
Page MG 18 - 7
Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.
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Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.
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