FAA / Advisory circular

AC 27-1B

Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft — Changes 1–9

Normal category rotorcraft guidance with Changes 1–9 incorporated. Search the complete AC or start with the system safety, flight controls and instrument-flight guidance.

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This source includes guidance for different amendments of Part 27. Match the guidance to the aircraft’s agreed certification basis: the 27.1309 entries for Amendments 27-21, 27-46 and 27-51 are separate. The base AC was issued on 30 September 1999; Change 9 is dated 23 June 2023. The FAA catalogue’s 30 September 2008 date is not the date of the latest change.

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6/13/2014                                      AC 27-1B, Chg 5


example, use the FS to gather data on aircraft transients caused by a failure, crew
recognition of the abnormal event, recoverability after the failure transient, and the
ability to continue safe flight and landing after recovery. There can be accomplishment
of these assessments for critical, selected conditions using the FS without presenting a
safety risk to the flight test crew.

               (1) Test Environment. The test environment for pilot-in-the-loop simulator
tests includes:

                           - Cockpit, equipped with AdFC representative displays and
                       controls.
                           - Computer Generated Imagining (CGI).
                           - Simulated AdFC system.
                           - Simulated rotorcraft visuals and behavior.

               (2) Verification of Simulation Tools.

                        (i) Before final evaluation of failure mode effects using a FS, validate
the FS for the specific test conditions identified in the test plan. This validation may be
done quantitatively, qualitatively, or both and must be in a manner suitable to the FAA.

                          (ii) There should be control of the FS configuration, including hardware
and software, to ensure there is no corruption of the functional performance, as
validated, during the certification process. The FS should be assessed to identify and
preclude opportunities for misleading simulator results that could affect the certification
process and ultimately the design of the AdFC systems.

               (3) Test Procedure and Expected Results. The test procedure for pilot-in­
the-loop simulator tests includes real-time simulation of performance with simulated
failures. The expected test results are:

                        (i) Evaluation of pilot intervention time (recognition and reaction time)
for the occurrence of failures under various flight conditions.

                          (ii) Assessment of handling qualities during recovery maneuvers.

                           (iii) Assessment of man-machine interface (controls and displays,
warnings, cautions, and advisories).

                     (iv) Evaluation of rotorcraft transients.

          (C) Bench Test. The installation of an AdFC system should include the
actual hardware and appropriate software version under configuration control. Any tests
performed should be documented and also maintained under configuration
management for repeatability.



                                                       Page MG 17 - 5

Saved from the FAA on November 17, 2026. All original pages are retained. Engineering explanations are presented separately below.

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Start with the certification basis and the function.

Identify the applicable amendment before selecting the safety guidance. Connect intended functions and operating conditions to failure conditions, architecture decisions, common-cause considerations, verification and limitations. For flight controls and IFR work, carry the relevant 27.672, 27.1329 and Appendix B assumptions into the system safety and compliance evidence.

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